HTML Transcription © F.Coakley , 2025
[Extracted from HO 45/11025/410118]
This report, never its seems published, was prepared by staff who had worked in a branch of the Home Office that had been established in November 1914 to deal with Civilian Internment in the UK. The typed document found in the National Archives at Kew has a few additions or corrections entered by hand - these have been merged into the typescript - a few large blocks of text have been spit into smaller paragraphs to ease reading on computer devices but the ordering of sentences etc. has been preserved.
This memorandum contains, first, a brief general account of the process of internment of civilian enemy subjects, and then separate notes on certain Special matters. Regard has been had to making it useful on any possible future occasion, and matter of only temporary interest has been omitted.
The Prisoners of War Branch was concerned throughout with civilian men only. Military and Naval prisoners were outside its scope. Women were never interned merely on the ground that they were enemy subjects, and those few who were interned on special grounds were dealt with by "B" Division of the Home Office.
Civilian Internment was limited generally speaking to men of military age (17-50) though men over and under military age were also interned if suspect or destitute, or if they had been taken from ships and had nowhere to go.
The internment of enemy subjects commenced at the beginning of the War with some two hundred suspects who were interned at once at Olympia, and at Frimley near Aldershot. General Internment did not take place until a few weeks later. A Circular was issued to the Police in September 1914, and another in October 1914, directing the internment of enemy Reservists, and other male enemy subjects of military age whom the Police thought likely to be dangerous. In pursuance of these Circulars the Police arrested and interned some 20,000 persons. They were accommodated in the following Camps:-
OLYMPIA (Building)
FRIMLEY (Camp under Canvas).
HAYWARD'S HEATH.
NEWBURY (Camp under Canvas).
STRATFORD (Disused Factory)
LANCASTER (Disused Factory)
STOBS (Camp of Huts).
OLDCASTLE, COUNTY MEATH (Workhouses)
WAKEFIELD (Pleasure grounds and buildings belonging thereto).
YORK (Buildings)
SOUTHAMPTON (Skating Rink)
DOUGLAS, Isle of Man, (Buildings)
TEMPLEMORE, Ireland (Barracks)
QUEENSFERRY.
HANDFORTH (Camps of Huts and Buildings)and several ships moored off Southend and the Isle of Wight.
The following were added later:-
ALEXANDRA PALACE (Buildings)
ISLINGTON (Workhouse)
KNOCKALOE (Camp of Huts)
FELTHAM (Buildings)
HACKNEY WICK (Workhouse)
LIBURY HALL (Buildings)
Libury Hall existed before the War as a farm Colony for aged and destitute Germans. This was used as a place to which all elderly and infirm Germans could be sent, and was later on constituted as a regular internment camp.
By the end of October 1914, the majority of the enemy civilians of military age had been interned, and large numbers of applications from relatives, friends, solicitors and others, were being received in the Home Office asking for release on ground of harmlessness, ill-health, injury to British Trade &c, The number of applications was increased by the fact that the discretion originally given to the Police, after consultation with the Commandant of the Camp, to liberate interned men of whose harmlessness they felt assured, had now been withdrawn; and the Secretary of State had become the only authority with power to release. The ordinary staff of the Home Office, already overpressed with war work, could not deal with them and the Prisoners of War Branch formed for the purpose; its members being either borrowed from other Departments or enlisted as volunteers from outside. The Branch was constituted on November 4th, and remained for a few days under the control of the Home Secretary.
The Secretary of State for War, however, did not at that time agree with the general internment of men of military age which he considered unnecessary and undesirable. Consultations were held between him and the Home Secretary at which it was decided to take steps for the release of part of the inmates of the Camps and also to transfer the Prisoners of War Branch to the War Office. The Branch remained situated in the Home Office but its work was done under the control of the Director of Prisoners of War, War Office.
Two Circulars were issued to the Police, in November and December 1914, informing them of the new position, putting to them certain definite questions, and asking them to make recommendations for release Throughout the rest of the winter 1914-15, the Branch worked on these recommendations 100 men were released from Olympia early in November under orders given directly by the Secretary of State for War to the Commandant, but with this the Branch had nothing to do. During the Winter, on the recommendations received from the Police in consequence of the Circulars, 2,778 men were liberated from the Camps. Those whose homes were in prohibited areas were released only on condition of not returning to a prohibited area. This however, formed the lesser part of the work. At this, and nearly all other times of the War, the great mass of the work which fell on the Branch consisted in dealing with the large numbers of applications addressed to the Home Office direct by relatives and friends, and with the numbers of persons who called to urge their requests verbally. When appeals were often in the most urgent terms, and circumstances of great hardship and distress were constantly alleged. Impending ruin to British industries, especially those necessary for War purposes for the want of some particular German expert, was frequently brought forward as reason for release, The task of dealing with these special applications was one of very great difficulty. The regular practice was for the Branch to make enquiries of M.I.5., and of the Police, and then to make a recommendation one way or the other, to the best of their ability, to the Director, Prisoners of War, War Office.
By April, 1915, the situation had become somewhat easier, the cases of the then inmates of the Internment Camps had been practically all reviewed, a number had been released, and the special applications had mostly been decided one way or the other, But early in May, 1915, the whole situation was changed. The sinking of the Lusitania gave rise to an outburst of indignation, and an urgent demand was made, in the House of Commons and in the Press, for the internment of all male enemy subjects without distinction. On May 13th, 1915. the Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that it had been decided to intern all male enemy subjects of military age; and to deport males over and under military age, and women. Exemptions from Internment or repatriation would only be allowed in exceptional cases, and were to be decided after the cases had been investigated and recommendations had been made by an Advisory Committee. Directions in this sense were issued to the Police.
The Advisory Committee was constituted in the same month, and consisted of two Judges of the High Court and several Members of Parliament. At the same time the Prisoners of War Branch was retransferred to the Home Office. To it was allocated the task of collecting the necessary information and preparing the cases for the Committee, conveying its recommendations to the Home Secretary, and carrying out his decisions. Enemy subjects were informed by notices in the Press that if they desired to be exempted from Internment or Repatriation, as the case might be, they must place their applications before the Advisory Committee, and forms for the purpose were issued by the Home Office.
The Committee began its work in June 1915. It divided itself into two Committees, each presided over by one of the Judges; one to deal with internment and one to deal with Repatriation.
Both Committees proceeded rapidly. The Committee on Repatriation dealt with 16,456 applications, and in 14,939 cases recommended that the applicants should be allowed to remain. The Committee on Internments, dealt with some 16,000 applications, and recommended exemption in 7,510 cases. More than half the recommendations for exemption from internment were granted in the cases of men of the races which, though subjects of the Central Powers were hostile to them and friendly to the Allies; such as Poles, Czechs, Alsatians, Slesvigers and Austrians of Italian race. In dealing with the [] the Committee acted to a very large extent on the advice of the racial Committees which first came into prominence at this time. These were Committees of established residents in this country belonging to the races in question, and were accepted as advisers by the British Authorities. (See separate Note).
The question of accommodation for the increasing number of internees was the first considerable difficulty. Some of the original camps had been discontinued. The ships had been taken for transports. Olympia was needed for other urgent purposes, and Lancaster and Newbury were unsuitable. To meet the fresh flood of interments it was decided to erect a large camp in the Isle of Man, both on account of the safety of the situation and because land could easily be obtained there. Certain existing buildings and grounds had already been taken over at Douglas, with accommodation for about 3,000; and a very large camp was now planned and built by degrees at Knockaloe more in the centre of the Island, This Camp, which at its maximum contained accommodation for some 25,000 men, consisted of wooden huts. It was sub-divided into four camps, and each Camp was further sub-divided into Compounds. As Knockaloe grew, the internments and transfers to that place proceeded, and by the Autumn of 1915, when the Camp was nearly completed, the total number of civilians interned in all Camps numbered over 30,000.
The work of the Prisoners of War Branch, which, in April 1915, had seemed to be nearing completion, began afresh with the decision for general internment and the appointment of the Advisory Committee. Not only did the Branch have to prepare the cases for the Committee, which was working at a high pressure; but it received every day numerous and most urgent appeals on every conceivable ground to cancel or postpone internment. An immense mass of such correspondence arrived daily, while telegrams, telephone calls and visitors streamed in incessantly. The appeals against Internment were all referred to the Committee. The same thing, however, could not be done with the daily stream of requests for postponement of internment on grounds of ill-health, to enable further material to be laid before the Committee, to settle business affairs, to give time to re-open the case; &c &c. As far as possible the plan followed in regard to these was to let the internment proceed unless it was plain that there must be some delay such as e.g. a proved case of serious illness; and to tell the applicants that the internment could not be stopped and that they must make their application for release.
The task frequently imposed on the Branch, of bringing fresh evidence to the notice of the Home Secretary after the Committee had dealt with the case, and making suggestions as to whether it was still desirable to carry out the Committee's recommendations or not, was an even more difficult one. Minuting these cases often involved a review of the Committee's recommendations. Had the Committee had more time for their work, and had they been fully informed when dealing with each case, it would have been out of place for the Branch to attempt to criticise their recommendations. But owing to the temper then prevailing in the country, the Committee were compelled to do their work under high pressure, and in many cases the information before them was inadequate. Hundreds of cases had therefore to be reviewed by the Branch in the light of reports which were not accessible to the Committee. As far as possible, the practice of the Branch was to refer such fresh information to the Secretaries of the Committee, or to any member of it who might be available, but at the end of October, 1915, the Committee decided to cease its work on ordinary appeals against internment or repatriation; so from that time on their assistance could no longer be obtained, and the Branch had to make its recommendations to the Home Secretary to the best of its own judgment. The Branch's review of these cases resulted in their recommending exemption in about 250 cases in which the Committee had advised internment; and internment in about 750 cases in which the Committee had advised exemption. By the end of 1915 the cases which came before the Advisory Committee had all been dealt with.
In 1916, no special new feature arose. The numbers in internment remained at about 30,000. Repatriation (see separate Note) lessened the numbers slightly, but this decrease was rather more than balanced by fresh internments, both of men residing in this country about whom new facts came to light, or who contravened the Aliens Restriction Order; and of men taken off ships. During the greater part of the year, the Branch's heaviest work was that of dealing with some 1500 Irish brought over to this country after the rebellion of Easter 1916, and interned at Frongoch Camp and Reading Prison. By Christmas 1916 these had all been released, and they do not form part of the subject of this memorandum.
There was no cessation in the stream of appeals for release, but the method of of dealing with them had become more systematic, and the task was rendered easier by the fact that they were practically never granted. Reports from the Police and M.I.5., came in from time to time suggesting grounds for suspicion in cases in which exemption from internment had been granted in 1915. The general rule in such cases was to intern, on the ground that exemption could only be maintained in cases where it appeared perfectly clear from every point of view that no danger to the country could possibly result. Internment was also the rule whenever the Police reported any breach of the provisions of the Aliens Restriction Order, it being held that an enemy Subject exempted from internment could only retain his exemption if he complied with the War regulations in every way. Similarly any breach of the ordinary law by an exempted alien entailed his internment as soon as his sentence of imprisonment (if any) had expired. Some progress was made with Camp Industries, and skilled German mechanics were collected at Hackney Wick (a disused Workhouse) for the manufacture of sewing machines (see separate Note).
The state of affairs with regard to internment remained the same throughout 1917 but the practice was commenced of licensing from the camps men of good character, to employers who required their services in order to meet the shortage of British labour in agriculture and the essential industries (See separate note.)
The principal new event of the year was Lord Newton's mission to Holland, to meet German delegates and arrange for the resumption and extension of Repatriation which had been interrupted in February 1917 by the commencement of unrestricted Submarine warfare (See separate Note). A member of the Branch accompanied this Mission. On the Internment side the principal result of this Mission, as regards Civilians, was an agreement to transfer to Holland, for internment in that country 1600 interned Germans and 400 interned British respectively. The principle of selection was that these persons were men who, though not fulfilling the standard of disability fixed as qualifying for repatriation, were "next most in need of relief from captivity on medical grounds."
There was no change in the early part of 1918. At the beginning of June a Second British Mission went to Holland under Lord Cave, and drew up with the German delegates a far reaching agreement for the exchange of military prisoners, and the mutual repatriation of civilians.
The agreement with regard to civilians abandoned the qualifications of age and physical disability hitherto observed, and provided for the repatriation of all those who desired to go, with the exception of a maximum of 70 Germans who might be retained by the British, and 40 British who might be retained by the Germans on special grounds. All others were to be sent if they so desired, This agreement also included an elaborate code of camp management. A member of the Prisoners of War Branch went on this Mission also. While the Mission was in Holland, a fresh agitation against alien enemies took place in England on the ground that there were still a number uninterned who should have been interned; and a fresh Advisory Committee was accordingly set up. This Committee, again sitting under the Chairmanship of a Judge of the High Court, reviewed the cases of those still at liberty, both on their merits and in the light of the popular feeling in the country; but found themselves unable on any ground to recommend more than 257 fresh internments; a testimony to the thoroughness of the work of the previous Committee and of the Prisoners of War Branch. They had not concluded their labours when the armistice was signed, and the order was given not to make any fresh internments. Recalls to the camps of men allowed out on licence for essential work continued to be made, but otherwise internment ceased.
The question then arose of sending the inmates of the camps home to their own countries. Towards the end of December, 1918, the war Office pronounced the military position to be such that the general repatriation of civilian alien enemies of military age might be safely be commenced, and arrangements were immediately made with the Ministry of Shipping. Owing to the immense demands on transport of all kinds, it proved to be a most difficult matter to obtain ships, but through the energetic assistance of the Ministry of Shipping, ships were obtained, and 21,000 inmates of the civilian internment camps, who were willing to go to their own countries, were dispatched to the Continent between the end of December 1918, and the end of April 1919, at the rate of about 600 a week at first and later, as more ships became available, 2000 to 3000 a week. By the end of April there remained in the internment camps only between 4000 and 5000 men, who refused to go. The Government appointed a Committee to investigate their cases and decide which of them should be allowed to remain and which of them should be sent compulsorily. At this point the Prisoners of War Branch was discontinued, and the task of carrying out the recommendations of the new Committee devolved upon "B" Division of the Home Office.
The conclusion at which the Branch arrived, as the result of its four and a half years of work, was that the general internment of Germans was a proper measure owing to their strong German patriotism, the extensive ramification of the German system of obtaining intelligence, and the impossibility of trusting assurances of pro-British feeling, whether made by a German or on his behalf. British subjects of unquestioned good faith were sometimes deceived, and were ready to pledge their words and their money for Germans who afterwards proved untrustworthy.
With regard to Austrians, there was more room for doubt. They had less attachment to their own country, and were more apt to identify themselves with the country in which they had settled. Austria had no such spy system as Germany. Moreover, Austrians were on the whole more honest than Germans; and further, more than half the Austrian subjects in this country belonged to races friendly to the allies, Substantially, however, the same rules were applied to them as to the Germans, though the Advisory Committees were more lenient to them in practice. Turks and Bulgarians stood on a different footing to Germans and Austrians. There were not many of them in this country, and such as there were, were generally uneducated men without sufficient brains to be dangerous. A certain number of them, who were destitute were interned for their own protection or support; but apart from this they were not interned, save in some individual cases in which suspicion arose.
Germans, however, certainly required internment. The further the work progressed, the more it became evident how difficult it was to believe that any individual German was harmless. They were adepts in their own defence, they told the most plausible stories, they commonly alleged that they had fled from their own country in order to escape German militarism, that they detested German methods of waging War, that they desired to identify themselves with this country, and do everything possible for the allied cause. Engineers, Chemists, Commercial men, and many others represented themselves as indispensable or as very important to the industries and trade of this country; and in some cases this contention was not far from the truth. They were usually men of long residence with businesses in this country. They had frequently married British wives, and had British relatives and British children. At first sight, in many of these cases, everything seemed to suggest that the men were wholeheartedly on the side of the allies. But, as time went on, reliable information was obtained in so many German cases which threw an entirely different complexion on the mens' real attitude, that the Branch was forced to the conclusion that it was impossible to trust any German on the word of merely himself and his own British born relatives and friends (who were often themselves deceived), and that the only cases in which it was possible to feel that exemptions should be maintained were those in which there was strong independent evidence. The principle on which the Branch acted was always to give the country the benefit of the doubt; that is to say, that if room for doubt existed. the man was recommended for internment.
Apart altogether from individual merits, account had to be taken of the fact that, as the War went on, the mere presence of an un-interned enemy subject frequently gave rise to public uneasiness in the place where he lived. Where there was evidence of such feeling, it was considered a proper ground for internment. There was also the consideration that even though an enemy alien might be considered safe under Police supervision, the Police throughout the War were under-manned and over-worked with innumerable duties; and the internment of the men relieved the pressure on them. Lastly, as the military demand for soldiers grew greater, cases began to come to light in which the trade or business of British Subjects called up for military service was in danger of being captured by come uninterned enemy alien, Such attempts were met by cancelling the exemption and interning the alien.
The special subjects which can most usefully be dealt with under separate notes are the following: -
Proposals for the mutual repatriation of certain classes of enemy civilians
were exchanged in September 1914, and by November, it had been agreed that the
following classes should be allowed to go on both sides :-
Women and children
Doctors of Medicine and Ministers of Religion.
Males over 55 and under 17.
This was the arrangement with Germany.
In the case of Austria, males of military age who were unfit for military service were included; but in the case of Germany, invalids of military age were left until the Autumn of 1915 when a special agreement was made with regard to them. The journeys were made by the ordinary Dutch passenger steamers plying between Tilbury and Rotterdam. In the autumn of 1915, an agreement was made with Germany for the mutual repatriation of invalids between the ages of 17 and 55. In choosing invalids for repatriation both to Germany and Austria, the standard of invalidity for the repatriation of combatant, prisoners was observed, though this was not expressed in the agreement. The individual cases in which repatriation had been refused were sometimes questioned by the German and Austrian Governments, but no urgent question of the physical standard for repatriation was ever raised. Seamen and ship's officers were held back from the operation of repatriation agreement at the instance of the Admiralty during the first part of the War. On December 4th, 1915, however, an agreement was made with Germany whereby young seamen under 17 were to be included like other young civilians. Seamen over 55 were also included in this agreement.
The repatriation agreements were not allowed [crossed thru ??] during the year 1916. On January 2nd, 1917, an agreement was concluded for the mutual repatriation of civilians between the ages of 45 and 55. This agreement differed from the former one in that it applied only to interned men, and moreover only to men who were interned on the date of the agreement, - January 2nd. 1917.
In February, 1917, the Dutch passenger steamers ceased running on account of the unrestricted submarine campaign, and repatriation stopped. 3,178 interned civilians had been repatriated up to that time. In June 1917, Lord Newton took a Mission to Holland to meet German delegates. Sittings,which lasted ten days, were held at the Hague, and the question of the resumption and extension of the repatriation, both of combatants and civilians, and of the internment of certain classes of both in Holland, were fully discussed. This Meeting resulted in an agreement of which the principal features affecting civilians were; (1) it was agreed that both sides should request the Netherlander Government to use their good offices to enable repatriation to be resumed (2) it was agreed that 400 British and 1600 German civilians, being those, who, though not qualified for repatriation as invalids, were next most in need of relief from captivity on medical grounds, should be interned in Holland. Following this agreement, prolonged correspondence took place between the British, German and Netherland Governments as to the ships to be used, and the route to be followed. It was finally settled that the route should be from Boston to Rotterdam and that certain Dutch ships bearing distinctive marks should be employed. Each side was to pay the Dutch the expenses of repatriating its own nationals. Voyages were resumed in October 1917, and between that date and the armistice, 3662 more interned civilians were returned to the Continent; making a total of 6840 between the beginning of the war and the Signing of the Armistice. Austrians, Bulgarians and Turks, as well as Germans, were - sent by these ships to Rotterdam owing to lack of any other route. These, like the Germans, were duly forwarded by the Netherland Government into Germany, and presumably were sent on their way by the German Government, as no question was ever raised about them. The Boston route was found to be expensive and inconvenient, but was the only one which, after long correspondence could be agreed open: and it continued to be used until the armistice.
A second British Mission under Lord Cave went to the Hague on June 5th 1918. The Mission travelled on the repatriation ships from Boston and one of the three ships was sunk on the voyage, but whether by mine or torpedo,or whether with any hostile intent to the Mission or not, has never been ascertained. This incident again put a stop to repatriation for a time, as the Dutch kept their remaining two ships in harbour; and it was not resumed until just before the Armistice. The sittings of the second Mission were prolonged, as questions of the first importance to both countries relating to the exchange of very large numbers of healthy combatant prisoners were under discussion. The agreement which resulted provided for the general repatriation of civilians on both sides, compensation being given to the British for the superior number of German civilians in the shape of an addition to the number of British combatants, This agreement, which was very elaborate, and contained among other things a code of regulations for the management of internment camps, and of the accommodation, diet etc., to be provided therein, was never carried out owing to the armistice. The Mission returned on July 19th after having sat for six weeks. Repatriation by the Boston route was resumed in October, but ceased after the signing of the armistice.
After the armistice, an interval occurred, during which enquiries were made of the War Office by Lord Cave's Prisoners' Committee, which at that time exercised general control over prisoner of war questions, as to when it would be safe to begin the repatriation of healthy civilians of a military age. The War Office replied towards the end of December that the military position was then such as to justify this step, and general repatriation from the camps was duly begun, It was pushed forward as rapidly as the restricted shipping facilities would allow, and thanks to the assistance of the Ministry of Shipping, 21,000 men from the internment camps, being all those who were willing to go, were got away by the end of April.
During the whole of the War incessant correspondence took place about repatriation questions between the British and German Governments and between the British and Austrian Governments through the diplomatic representatives, who were first of all The United States Embassy, and afterwards the Swiss and Swedish Legations. It would occupy far too much space to give an account of all the questions which arose, but the following points may be noted, as they may be useful on any future occasion.
(a) Precision in repatriation agreements is necessary. Little trouble resulted when the text was drawn up carefully and defined fully and clearly the classes of persons to whom the agreement applied, the method of precedure [sic procedure], the incidence of the expenses, &c. This was the case with the later agreements. But where, as happened with some of the agreements made early in the War, the arrangement was not embodied in a single well considered text, but had to be gathered from a mass of correspondence between the the two Governments and the representatives of the protective powers, much misunderstanding arose. This, inflamed by the mutual suspicion and nervous tension natural to a state of war, led to long delays and frequent stoppages in the execution of the agreements.
(b) Provision should always be made as to the exact incidence of expenses. The fairest plan is for each side to pay the expenses of repatriating its own nationals. The Austrians did this. The Germans did not, although they more than once undertook to do so. The Germans moreover refused to pay the expenses of repatriating the British from Ruhleben, and these had to be paid out of British funds supplied to the protecting diplomatic representatives in Berlin. The result was that this country lost considerably as against Germany in the matter of repatriation expenses; although every German who could pay for his passage was made to do so, or at any rate compelled to make a contribution towards it. German Civilians possessing money were required to leave behind them any sums in excess of £10 which they still possessed after paying their own fares. This sum was afterwards increased to £50 with a total limit of £150 for a family.
(c) Searching before departure was carried out by special Police Officers from Scotland Yard, who visited the camps before the parties left. This precaution proved necessary, as the interned men constantly endeavoured to convey out of the country articles of which there was a shortage in Germany owing to the Blockade.
(d) Wives who were leaving England often asked to be allowed to travel on the same ships with their interned husbands. When the ordinary Dutch passenger steamers were still running from Tilbury in the earlier part of the War, this was often possible. Afterwards, however, when repatriation took place by the special ships from Boston, it was found impracticable, and permission had to be refused, The interned men were advised to inform their wives of their departure so that the latter could follow them to Holland at the first opportunity.
(e) The repatriation of youths up to the age of 17 proved to be a mistake. Owing to the length of the war, lads who were over 14 when it began had time to grow up into soldiers and join the hostile armies, The number was small, but every man counts, The same remark applies to a less extent to the men over the age of 45. As the drain on the belligerent powers grew greater, we have reason to know that these men were employed in munition works, and some of them made into soldiers,
(f) Paroles were taken from the Austrians but were useless in the case of Germans, because the German Government would not recognise them.
(g) The British Government throughout the War retained certain individuals, chemists, engineers, and others, although qualified for repatriation under the agreements, on account of their special value to the enemy. The right to make such exceptions was contested by the Germans, but was always maintained by the British; and paragraphs giving the right to retain a specified number of individuals were embodied in the agreements about men over 45, and in the second Hague Agreement of 1918.
(h) Merchant ships' Officers and seamen provided material for acute controversy throughout the War, owing to their value to the enemy. It is sufficient to record here that the principal factor in every decision was the Admiralty view; and that, should there ever again be a war with a naval power, these persons should be excluded in terms from all ordinary agreements for repatriation, and should be made a subject of a separate agreement.
The notes above relate principally to repatriation to Germany, The cases of Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, were of much less importance, as the numbers wishing to go were few. The questions that arose between this country and the three latter powers are scarcely worth the space it would need to record them. They were dealt with, generally speaking, on the same lines as in the case of Germany. The Austrian Government behaved much better than the German, in as much as they paid the expenses of repatriating their people from Great Britain, and we believe they did their best to enforce the paroles that Austrian subjects gave before leaving. A separate agreement was made in the winter of 1917-18 with the Turks by a British Mission under Lord Newton,who met the Turkish Delegates at Berne; but owing to the difficulties of transport between this country and Turkey it had no effect. This agreement related principally to combatants. Such interned civilian Turks as were sick or aged were dispatched from this country through Holland into Germany independently of agreements. Only one or two Bulgarians ever qualified for repatriation,and these were sent to Germany likewise.
Idleness was the worst feature of internment, and in the camps in this country probably caused more bodily ill-health and mental suffering than any other. Persistent endeavours to organise camp industries were made throughout the War, but only three distinct successes can be be recorded; namely, the Brush-Making Industries at Islington and Douglas and the Sewing Machine Industry at Hackney Wick. At Islington and Douglas the necessary machinery for Brush-Making was installed by Contractors, Instructors were engaged, inmates taught, and the output sold through the Contractors to Government Departments and the Pubic: Both enterprizes were financially successful, and though criticised by the Brush Makers' Association, were maintained until the end of the War. Care was taken not to handicap British made articles, and as there was a Shortage of Brushes the output was of assistance. These two Brush-Making plants between them gave continuous employment to an average of about 600 interned aliens. The men were paid at ordinary rates and were allowed to retain their earnings less a deduction for maintenance.
At Hackney Wick a disused Workhouse was taken over and occupied by a number of highly skilled German mechanics selected from all the Interment Camps. These men were employed by Messrs Vickers in making Sewing Machines with a view to driving the cheap German Sewing Machines out of the British Market. Messrs. Vickers provided the machinery and employed and paid the men. The special work of these skilled mechanics was that of making the various machine tools, which in their turn manufactured the numerous parts (some 360) of the Sewing Machines. The making of these machine tools is very difficult and expert work and occupied over a year. About 100 of the skilled mechanics were sent to Hackney Wick in 1916, but it was not until 1917 the machine tools were ready and the manufacture of the parts of the Sewing Machines was begun. When all was ready, an additional number of less skilled men were drafted into Hackney Wick to do the work of assembling the Sewing Machines; and from the Autumn of 1917, to the end of the War, these Sewing Machines were turned out and sold by Messrs. Vickers in increasing numbers.
Many efforts were made to organise other Camp Industries, but with no great success. A certain number of men, such as watchmakers, were allowed to have work sent in from outside and to do it in the Camp. Numbers were were employed in keeping the Camp buildings in repair, and in cultivating garden and vegatable ground.
In the Isle of Man some quarrying and road-making was done outside the Camp. But for the most part, when the ordinary Camp fatigue duties, to which every inmate was liable, had been performed, the interned men had to fill up the rest of the day as best they could. The principal obstacles to any large Camp Industries were the need for workshops, machinery, instructors and materials. When the resources of the nation were strained to the utmost, the output likely to be obtained was not nearly sufficient to justify the employment of men, materials, and money badly wanted for other purposes. The needs of the nation had to come first, and therefore the idea of creating large Camp Industries had to be dropped.
Some employment was afforded in the latter part of the war by a system of licensing particular men from the camps to individual employers, in order to meet the shortage of labour in agriculture and in some of the essential industries. The man so licensed had to be of good character and trustworthy so far as was known. Each was allocated to a particular employer, who signed an undertaking to board and lodge him; and to report to the Police immediately if he broke any of the provisions of the Aliens Restriction Order, or misconducted himself in any way whatever. This plan worked well and was of some benefit to the country.
A number of men on arriving at their work proved to be unsuitable for, or ignorant of, the work they professed themselves able to do; and were returned to the Camp in consequence, A few misconducted themselves and were also re-interned. But on the whole, the licensed men behaved well and worked well, In the years 1917 and 1918, a net total of about 1400 satisfactory men were placed with farmers and about 400 with industrial employers. After the Armistice, the licences were terminated (with a few exceptions) and the men were gradually recalled to the Internment Camps as British demobilisation proceeded.
One or two German experts, whose services were of importance, were interned
in their employers' works under conditions laid down by the Home Office and
enforced by the Police, Examples of this method were:- ;
(a) an expert in making miners' lamp glasses, at Sheffield.
(b) an expert in making a patent insulating material,at Stroud.
(c) a dyer's chemist at Carlisle.
These men worked well and no trouble worth notice arose from their being employed in this manner.
Passing from the interned men to those exempted from internment, a certain number of exemptions were granted to Germans of military age on account of the public importance of their work, such as workers on Magnetos, at the Bosch Magneto Company; workers on Zeiss Field Glasses at the Carl Zeiss Optical Works, Mill Hill, and two or three expert chemists at the Ellesmere Port Works, etc, In one or two cases the beginnings of an Industry hitherto entirely German were established in this manner, such as the commencement of the manufacture of Hosiery Needles at Redditch, and of Vacuum Flasks in London, in both cases through the conditional exemption of a German. There was never any doubt of the value of following this plan in proper cases. The difficulty attending it was that the employers often wanted to keep the Germans indefinitely. The precedure followed to meet this was to inform the employer, first of all,that the man was exempted only for the time being, and only on the conditions that he continued the work he was required to do, instructed British employees in that work, and communicated fully to his employer any trade secrets he might possess. Later on employers were told, in subsequent correspondence or verbally, that they could not keep their Germans indefinitely, and that they must use their best efforts to get as many British employees instructed by them, as they possibly could; since the Germans might be withdrawn at any time and certainly would be withdrawn before long. (Such conditional exemptions were granted chiefly in 1915 and 1916, In 1917 and after, the licensing system was used in such cases), Towards the end of 1917, employers who had by that time had the services of these conditionally exempted men for about two years, were warned ,and asked how soon they could dispense with them; and during that winter and throughout 1918, such men were gradualy collected into the Camps. Strong protests were received from some employers but the Home Office maintained the view that the industries in question must not remain dependent on German experts and that, if the employers had not in the course of two or, three years been able to train substitutes, they never would be able to.
When the National Service Act was passed and brought into operation in 1917 it was applied to those male enemy aliens who had hitherto been exempted from internment or repatriation. They were given the choice of becoming National Service volunteers, or having their exemptions withdrawn, A few refused to sign the National Service volunteer form of undertaking and wore interned; but most of them signed. The forms were collected by the Police and forwarded to the Home Office, who transmitted them to the National Service Department. Little work resulted however,as individual employers would scarcely ever take the men, owing to the state of public feeling. The only way to make use of them proved to be to employ them in gangs on road-making or other public works. When called up by the National Service representatives for this work, some refused to obey the summons, others came but declined the work, while most of them proved to be physically unfit for heavy manual labour, which was the only kind available, A few gangs were employed, but the total of useful workers did not exceed 300, There was one useful, though unforeseen result of the scheme. Some hundreds of alien enemies, mostly Jews, who were employed on private work, left it, and sought employment in the factories of the Contractors for Army Clothing. They did this because the National Service Department had let it be known that they would not call up volunteers who were already engaged on work of public utility. The output of army clothing was improved in consequence.
The majority of the exemptions from internment which were granted by the Secretary of State on the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, were granted to men who, though subjects of an enemy power, belonged to races friendly to the allies. Both before and after the general internment, and throughout the War, applications for exemption on the ground of belonging to these races were numerous, and the task of sifting and enquiring into them proved to be one of the principal parts of the work. The greatest care was needed in these cases In some of them the racial kinship was doubtful; in others, there was room for suspicion of enemy connections and enemy sympathies, especially as numbers of the men had lived for a great part of their lives among their fellow enemy subjects. Still more often, it was found that a man alleging to be of friendly race desired to take advantage of his peculiar position to keep aloof from the war altogether, to fight and work for neither side, and thus to safeguard himself in any event. In some cases there was reason to sympathize with this attitude, and allowance was made for it, e.g. in the case of Alsatians with property and relatives in Alsace, who contended quite reasonably that these might suffer at the hands of the German if it were known that they were exerting themselves on behalf of the allies, In other cases the motive was merely to escape all trouble and danger, and to extend a business at the expense of British subjects called up for military service. The general principle observed was to make allowances for cases in which there was reasonable fear that relatives and property situated in enemy countries might suffer; but otherwise to require the man to be on one side or the other, that is to say, to work for the allies if called upon to do so, or else to accept the position of an enemy subject and be interned. They were not compelled to fight for the allies, but were, in certain cases, accepted as volunteers.
Most of these races were akin to one or the other of the Allied belligerents, and in dealing with them the advice of the representatives of those powers were sought and followed. The action taken varied from time to time during the War with the changing circumstances, but constant touch was maintained throughout with the Diplomatic Representatives of the belligerents concerned, and every change of practice was arranged in consultation with them. Committees consisting of men belonging to the races in question, of known character and of some length of residence in this country, and approved by the Diplomatic Representatives of the belligerents concerned, were set up from the first in the case of the principal races; namely, Poles, Czechs, Alsatians and Italians of the unredeemed territories. An Armenian Committee under the presidency of a British subject of Armenian race arose later, The cases of the Serbs, Sleswig Danes, Roumanians and Greeks were dealt with on the direct advice of the Serbian, Danish, Roumanian and Greek Legations. Arabs were not represented, but obtained general exemption from enemy restrictions as the British Armies advanced, by means of amendments of the A.R.O. Military service in the British Army was not required as a condition of exemption. Volunteers, moreover, were accepted for the Labour Battalions only, with the exception of the Czechs, who alone of all the friendly races were permitted to enter British Combatant units. The Czechs fought well, and justified the special confidence placed in them. Poles, however, were allowed to enter the Polish Army in France, if passed as satisfactory by the Polish Mission in this country and accepted by the French Authorities.
Alsatians who volunteered were accepted by the French Army, and Italians from the unredeemed territories in that of Italy.
As it was impossible to grant exemptions to all the men professing to be of friendly race, since many of the cases were too doubtful, a separate camp was established at Feltham in Middlesex, in which those of them whom it was thought desirable to intern were collected. This had the double advantage of removing the genuine men from the German Camps, where they were unpopular and sometimes ill-treated; and of enabling the Authorities to get a better idea of their real sympathies, which in the German Camps they did not dare express. Feltham Camp,proved a success, and it was found possible to liberate a number of the men after they had been sufficiently tested there. Combatants as well as Civilians were located in this camp; and when, in 1918, the military authorities decided to allow combatant prisoners of Polish race to enlist in the Polish Army in France, the place became a Polish Military centre,at which combatant prisoners of Polish race were collected, and, after examination, were drafted to France in considerable numbers.
Representatives of the Allied belligerent nations, with which these men claimed kinship, sometimes asked for the release of individuals whom the British authorities did not feel justified in setting at liberty in this country. The course pursued in those cases was to inform the Diplomatic Representatives concerned that, while there were reasons precluding release in this country, the man could and should be released at any time to go to the country with which he claimed kinship. The Legation concerned was invited to arranged a passage, and informed that as soon as they had done so the man should be sent to join the ship. On the whole, the fairness of this proposal was recognised by the Allied Legations, and the rule was maintained without much difficulty. In this manner, e.g. a number of Alsatians were sent to France, and a number of Sleswig Danes to Denmark.
The Polish Information Committee, under Russian auspices, at first charge of the interests of the Poles; but in 1916, the Russian Embassy transferred its recognition to a Society known as the Polish Exiles Protection, and the British Government followed suit. This latter Society was composed of careful and able people, and did its work well. When the first steps began to be taken for recognising the Poles as a Nation, the political side of this Society's work was taken over by the Polish National Committee, which was composed in part of the same individuals; the Polish Exiles Protection remaining in existance for charitable purposes only. After the armistice, the Polish National Committee became the Polish Legation. The change in status from a National Committee to a Legation had this effect, that, whereas previously the British Authorities usually acted on the recommendations of the Committee, but held themselves at liberty to refuse release if they thought fit, after the change release was granted without further enquiry on the Polish Legation's statement that the man was of Polish nationality.
Jewish questions proved troublesome to the Poles throughout. Until the Poles became a Legation they did not consider themselves entitled to consider the cases of Jews from Poland. These were dealt with by a separate Polish Jews Committee composed of British subjects, and a number of exemptions were granted on their recommendations. This Committee dealt with the London cases, and similar Committees were subsequently formed to examine the applications of Polish Jews in Glasgow and Manchester, the other two large centres in which these people were found. These Polish Jews' coumittees worked well on the whole, though the Home Office was unable to accept all their recommendations. When the Polish Legation was established a change was made and the new Diplomatic Body accepted the cases of Jews from Poland, as well as those of men of Polish race. The Polish Jews Committee then ceased their work. In connection with the Jewish question it is worth noting that some attempt was made, by the Polish Jews Comittee in London, to claim that Jews as a whole should be recognised as a separate friendly nation, and dealt with accordingly. This claim, however, could not be accepted, as the sympathies of large numbers of Jews in Germany and Austria were known to be with those countries.
The Czech Committee ran a smoother course. It contained no men of distinction, Its members were largely persons who had followed the occupations of Waiter, Hairdresser, etc. for many years in this country. The character and sincerity of these men commanded respect, and they proved themselves to be careful and reliable. The composition of the Committee changed slightly from time to time, since those of its members who were of military age enlisted in the British Army, and were replaced by others but its work remained good throughout. So enthusiastic were they for the Allied cause, that, when the privilege of enlistment in British combatant units was . granted to the Czechs, they were a little inclined to go too far, and to threaten some of the Czechs in this country who were of military age that they would report them for internment if they did not enlist. The P/W Branch was obliged to ask them not to do this, and to point out to them that no subject of the enemy countries was forced to fight for the allied cause, At the end of the War they, like the Poles, became a Legation, and thenceforward their report, that an interned man was of Czech Nationality, was sufficient to secure his release.
Alsatian interests were undertaken, with the approval of the French Government, by the Ligue Patriotique Des Alsaciens Lorraine, Their work during the greater part of the War was rendered somewhat difficult by the fact that most of the Alsatians of military age had gone off to fight for France at the beginning, and they were only left with two or three hundred men whose sympathies were rather doubtful. In 1917, a French Officer, of Alsatian family, was specially sent over to assist them. After examining in the Camps such of the men as were interned he recommended the release of most of them into this country. This however, the British authorities were unable to gant, as they regarded the sympathies of these men as somewhat doubtful. But, following their usual practice,they offered to liberate them to go to France. After a good deal of discussion, the French Embassy agreed to this, and Monsieur Lotti left for France taking with him 96 of these men, 7 or 8 only, on whose behalf he made special recommendations, were liberated in this country.
The Italian Committee, established with the approval of the Italian Ambassador, did its best, but its work was somewhat hampered by the reluctance of the Authorities in Italy to give any positive guarantee in cases of individuals whose papers were referred home for advice. Nevertheless it was of assistance. The men with whom it had to deal were mostly itinerant kmife-grinders, street musicians, and ice cream sellers, who were chiefly distinguished by marked reluctance to do anything at all except ply their own trades. When the National Service Scheme came into operation, a number of them, though harmless from a political point of view, had to be interned on account of their refusing to undertake any form of National Service work.
Slesvig Danes, Serbs, and Greeks, were dealt with, as already mentioned above, by referring each individual case to the Legation concerned for enquiry and report. The Armenian Committee, under Colonel Gregory, was of some assistance, but a few Armenians had to be interned owing to their lack of means of support. Arabs were a standing difficulty, as they had no representative. They were usually ship's firemen, and could not be accepted on British ships, nor was it possible to return them to their own countries. They were not numerous, but they usually had to be retained in internment owing to their destitution.
Before release or repatriation, reference was made, in the case of seamen or ship's officers to the Director of Naval Intelligence; in the case of all others, to M.I.5., War Office; and their recommendations were followed, Before release into this country, reference was made also to the Police. Camp administration, transfers from camp to camp, and the embarkation of men for repatriation, were carried on by the War Office. Exceptions to this rule were the Isle of Man camps, which, though guarded by the War Office, were under Home Office administration, and the camps at Islington, Hackney Wick and Libury Hall, which were all administered under the directions from the Home Office and guarded by the Police. In 1916, at the instance of the Home Secretary, the arrangements for visiting in all the camps were transferred to the Home Office; but apart from this the Home Office had no concern in the internal administration of the military camps.
Correspondence with the Diplomatic Powers protecting the interests of enemy subjects, at first the United States Embassy, and afterwards the Swiss and Swedish Legations, was voluminous and incessant; and from the very beginning of the War a change in the ordinary procedure became necessary. In the ordinary course, correspondence cannot take place direct between the Home Office and a foreign Embassy or Legation, but must pass through the British Foreign office, The mass of such correspondence however, immediately proved to be so great that it could not be conducted in this manner, and from the Autum of 1914 onwards, nearly all such correspondence relating to individual cases as well as a good deal on general questions passed between the Home Office and the Protecting Representatives direct. It was, however, conducted in a semi-official form. Constant personal touch was also maintained between the P/W Branch and the Diplomatic representatives concerned, and this freedom of conversation proved to be of great assistance. Indeed, the work could not have been carried on without it.
Lord Newton's branch of the Foreign Office dealt with Prisoner of War questions from the first. In 1916, Lord Newton became Chairman of a Committee which included representatives of the admiralty, War office and the Home Office (P.W. Branch) and when necessary, of other departments; to deal with inter-departmental questions relating to prisoners of war. By this means, much inter-departmental correspondence was saved. The questions discussed, were principally those relating to repatriation. At the begining of 1917, Lord Newton's Branch was detached from the Foreign Office, and became a separate department, whose special duty was to deal with prisoner of war questions which concerned two or more of the other Departments. His Committee continued to meet as an adjunct to the new Department, Both the Committee and the new Department proved to be of service in enabling differences of opinion to be settled by discussion, and thus saving inter-departmental correspondence which would otherwise have run to great lengths. several members of the Committee and the Department took part in the Missions to the Hague in 1917 and 1918. Repatriation of civilians was the only one among the subjects discussed which specially concerned the Home Office, questions of internment and exemption being reserved for the Home Secretary.
A Committee, called first the Destitute Aliens Committee, and later the Civilian Internment Camps Committee, which consisted of representatives of the Home Office, War Office, Local Government Board and the Charity Organisation Society, sat regularly at the Home Office. Their Chief concern was the administration of the Isle of Man Camps, Islington, Hackney Wick, and Libury Hall, and the industries carried on at those places. A member of the Prisoners of War Branch attended those Meetings.
Generally speaking, the mass of business arising out of War conditions was so great and concerned so many Departments of State, that it could not be carried on by correspondence between Departments, however strengthened in personnel. Committees, on which representatives of several Departments met regularly, proved to be necessary; and, as they gained in experience, these Committees learned to settle points of difference and make decisions with tolerable speed, and success. Even so, delays were apt to arise, even in critical matters, through certain representatives being unable to pledge their Departments without consulting their Chief and when in some future crisis business again has to be conducted in this manner, it will be a sound thing for Departmental Chiefs to give their representatives on these joint bodies as full powers as they possibly can. Several times during the War the suggestion was made that a single Department should be constituted, under a separate Minister, to deal with all matter relating to Prisoners of War. The difficulty about this was that the new Department would have been at a disadvantage in certain matters which particularly belonged to one of the existing Departments; e.g. it would not have been easy for any Department but the Home Office to circularise the Police Forces, and carry on correspondence with them about interned persons and persons who might be interned. In fact, relations with the police in all important matters had to be maintained by the Home Office even during the few months the Prisoners of War Branch was attached to the War Office. The best arrangement, on the whole, was probably that which existed during the last months of fighting and the early months of the Armistice, when Lord Cave, then Home Secretary, presided over a "Prisoners Committee" which contained representatives of all Departments concerned; and possessed, and did exercise when necessary, final authority on all matters relating to Prisoners of War.
The file also included a very long and detailed report by the War Office dealing with the both Combatant and Civilian Prisoners of War that had been sent to the Home Office for comments - this is treated elsewhere . There were three other short reports in the same file which give considerably more details about the final days of Civilian Internment and the closure of the camps - these are dated 22 December 1919;
The position in P/W branch on May 1st 1919 when it was decided that the branch should be merged in B. Division, was that there were some 5000 enemy aliens still interned at Knockaloe Alexandra Palace, Feltham, Islington and Libury Hall Internment Camps. These included some hundreds of men who claimed to be subjects of friendly races (chiefly Poles and Polish Jews), but whose claims for release as such had not yet been substantiated. A Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice Younger had just been appointed to consider and advise the Secretary of State upon applications for exemption from compulsory repatriation on the part of the interned enemy aliens. The work of this Committee needs no discussion: a full report was issued in October last. The work in connection with P/W's from May onwards comprised chiefly (a) Repatriation (b) Releases from internment. In addition of course arose many applications for temporary releases, transfers from one camp to another, questions relating to P/W's : property, lost luggage &., and other miscellaneous matters in connection therewith and especially regarding men who claimed to be of friendly nationality.
The merger of the Branch did not therefore mean that the work was nearly at an end, on the contrary, for some time it increased. The appointment of the Advisory Committee caused an extraordinary quantity of applications for immediate releases to come in from relatives of the interned, firms who had employed or wished to employ a particular man, and petitions from public bodies and even disinterested persons. Each applicant thought the case in which he or she was interested ought to be dealt with first. For a month or so it was difficult to keep abreast of the work in view of the large number of callers many of whom it was desirable to see because for the most part the writers seemed unable to state their cases at all clearly.
Between May and December, nearly 5000 cases had action taken upon them departmentally. Of this number about 4,300 have been advised on by the Committee. In conclusion the general policy from May onwards was to advance the repatriation of such men as were to go voluntarily or compulsorily, as speedily as possible, and pending the conclusion of Peace with Germany to release as many of the "Friendlies" as circumstances permitted, and to clear the Camps a¢ the earliest possible moment in the interests of justice and economy.
NOTE Feltham Camp during the period under discussion only contained a few civilian P/W's all of whom claimed to be subjects of races Friendly to the Allies. On the 1st May 1919, there were some 25 interned there.
On May 1st 1919 27754 enemy aliens had already been repatriated, of whom 22891 were Germans, 4734 Austrians, 104 Turks and 25 Bulgarians. With but few exceptions these were all volunteers. The appointment of the Advisory Committee about this time caused voluntary repatriation to cease altogether for the time being, because the aliens were naturally chary of leaving their country of adoption of their own free will as soon as they were given an opportunity to represent their claims to stay in this country to a Committee. So from now onwards repatriation necessarily slowed down and at the end of May it became difficult to make up parties for repatriation in reasonable numbers, (parties of at least one hundred were aimed at) as refusals from the Committee only filtered through slowly and in small numbers. However, the various Commandants were instructed to obtain as many volunteers as possible, and soon they began to mount again. Between May and November, out of 989 men repatriated about 602 were volunteers. The large proportion of voluntary over compulsory repatriations from May onwards may to a great extent be attributable to the following causes:
(1). Many of the men thought they would have little chance of their claims being considered favourably the Committee and that if they went voluntarily they would have a better claim to be allowed to return to the United Kingdom.
(2). A number were still willing to go and were only awaiting the conclusion of the Peace Treaty: i.e. they had not volunteered till that event took place for fear of being in some instances drafted into into the German Army or arrested as deserters.
(3). Some thought they had little chance of obtaining employment if they were permitted to remain here.
(4). A minor cause was the closing down of Alexandra Palace and the P/W's transfer to the canvas Camp at Frith Hill, (between 50 and 100 volunteered at once to go) and as time went on they disliked their life there more and more.
The following note regarding the machinery of repatriation to the end of May may serve some useful purpose on a possible future occasion.
It was necessary to have a collecting camp so that each party might start from some central point. Alexandra Palace was found to be the most convenient for this purpose being near the Port of Embarkation, Harwich, and was thus used until its closure at the end of May. The Ministry of Shipping provided accommodation - ships were none too plentiful even at this period but they could generally provide a sailing once a week via Harwich - Rotterdam.
The procedure was as follows:-
(1). To ask the Ministry of Shipping when they could provide a ship, giving approximately the numbers for whom accommodation was required.
(2). Write to the Camps telling the Commandants when a boat was leaving, giving the names of the compulsory cases, and asking them to get the names of as many volunteers as possible, and transfer the men to Alexandra Palace a day or two before the sailing date - if under 20 in number.
(3). When all the names had been ascertained S.R.1.. War Office, was asked to arrange for the transfer of the party from the Camps to Alexandra Palace if over 20 in number, and from there to the Port of Embarkation.
(4). A week's notice was given to the Swiss and Swedish Legations who looked after the German and Austrian interests, and Prisoners of War Department of the Foreign Office, so that they might be able to notify their representatives in Holland, and so that the British Minister at the Hague might notify the Dutch Authorities to enable proper arrangements for the reception of the P/W's in Holland to be made.
(5). Before leaving the P/W's were searched by the Scotland Yard Authorities to see they had nothing ; on them which they were not allowed to take out of the country, e.g. leather goods &c.
Each P/W was allowed to take with him luggage not exceeding 100-lbs in weight, and such light hand baggage as he could carry. He might also take with him money to the value of a maximum of £10, subsequently increased to £50 and latterly to £100;
Each volunteer paid a sum of £2 towards the cost of repatriation where he possessed £4. Otherwise in proportion since he was allowed to have £2 of his own.
A compulsory deportee paid nothing.
Each deportee carried a repatriation card with him which was given up to the aliens Officer at the Port of Embarkation. A nominal roll in duplicate was also prepared by Colonel Luscombe (Alexandra Palace) one part of which was signed by the Captain of the ship and returned to the Home Office. Copies of this were sent to the prisoners of War Information Bureau (in duplicate) and to Colonel Lundblad (Swedish Legation ) as to Austrians. The Swiss Legation have never asked for numbers of the Germans repatriated and consequently were not sent nominal rolls.
The work of repatriation required very close and constant attention as alterations in details had frequently to be made, and often at the last moment:- for instance men who had volunteered would suddenly change their minds and have their names taken off the voluntary list. The procedure, however, worked on the whole very smoothly,: and very few complaints were received even from the P/W's themselves.
At the end of May two events occurred to alter and check the process of repatriation.
(1). The Ministry of Shipping announced that they were no longer responsible for providing shipping accommodation, Thus civilian repatriation became dependent on the accomodation which the War Office could provide. It should be stated, however, that they were nearly always willing to assist the Home Office as far as possible.
(2). The War Cabinet decided to take over Alexandra Palace and use it to house Government Officials. This delayed repatriation considerably, as it entailed the it loss of the only convenient collecting Camp. None of the others were at all suitable. Knockaloe being too far away and Frith Hill (to which the inhabitants of Alexandra Palace were transferred) being so far from the station; in addition the men from Knockaloe and Islington would have had to be brought back through London again if they started from Frimley, and Islington was at this time full, and had not sufficient guards for large numbers of compulsory repartees. However, the problem was solved by the fact that for some time afterwards, there were very few deportees from Knockaloe either voluntary or otherwise, the majority coming from Frith Hill so that arrangements were made for the Knockaloe men to be sent to Islington overnight whence they started for Holland with the Islington men, while the men from Frith Hill were sent separately to the Port of Embarkation. Curiously enough one effect of the closing of Alexandra Palace was that a sudden influx of volunteers came along. Between 50 and 100 men asked to be allowed to go to Germany rather than live under canvas at Frith Hill. They went.
In June 1919, it was found that the Peace Treaty had provided that questions regarding P/W's should be dealt with by Sub-Commissions to be set up under the Treaty. After a Meeting, however, with General Bellfield at the War Office it was decided, that in view of the fact that the bulk of civilian repatriation had been completed and the probable delay in the appointment of the Commissions, civilian repatriation should continue as hitherto. In the light of subsequent events the decision was undoubtedly correct, because at this date repatriation is at an end and the Commissions are still in Embryo.
In the meanwhile volunteers continued to come in satisfactorily, Frith Hill supplying the majority as the P/W's were somewhat unsettled there, until the signature of the Peace Treaty by Germany when the Home Secretary decided the time had now come for the release of those men whom the Advisory Committee had recommended should be permitted to remain here, From that date voluntary repatriation terminated except for a few isolated cases.
At the end of September compulsory repatriation received a further check. The War Office intimated that until further notice, owing to the allied decision to commence the repatriation of combatants without waiting for the coming into force of the Peace treaty with Germany, they required all accommodation on the Harwich boats for combatants. The Railway Strike also intervened. However, there were few men left for repatriation, and arrangements were made for parties of 31 and 27 to be conveyed from Tilbury to Rotterdam by the Batavier Steamship Company.
By the end of October there were only six compulsory cases left at Islington, and these were conveyed to Holland by arrangement with Mr. Cable, of the Society for the Relief of Foreigners in Distress.
The total number repatriated since the 1st May 1919, is 989.
At the beginning of May there were between 4500 and 5000 civilian P/W's interned at Knockaloe, Feltham, Alexandra Palace, Islington and Libury Hall, and a few invalids at Belmont and the German Hospital. The Advisory Committee had just begun to sit and nearly all the men interned had applied for exemption from repatriation. Consequently applications poured in from all over the country for precedence in having cases heard and immediate releases &c. Relatives and employers called at the Home Office daily almost, one might say in droves, asking to be satisfied on all manner of questions. It was decided, however, that as there was no obligation to release men at that time even though they had been recommended for exemption, and in view of there still being considerable hostile feeling in at anyrate some parts of the country against enemy aliens and the likelihood of protests and even riotous outbursts, not to release the aliens until after the signature of the Peace Treaty with Germany. Accordingly, except in a few cases where the Committee had advised immediate releases on grounds of ill-health &c., the men were still detained. On the 23rd July Peace had been signed with Germany, and there was a chance that it might be ratified before the Aliens Bill, with its proposed power to keep persons interned after they have ceased to be alien enemies, was passed. Consequently it was decided to start releasing exempted P/W's and thus avoid the necessity of releasing them En Bloc in the event of the Committee not having completed their labours before Ratification. In order not to attract too notice it was arranged that comparatively small numbers be released from the Camps daily (not exceeding 100 in all) The greatest proportion releases at first took place from Frith Hill Camp, as internment there had involved the greatest hardships on the men and their families.
That Camp had come into being again at the end of May, owing to the decision of the War Cabinet, before referred to, to use Alexandra Palace to house Government Officials. There was no other Camp to which the aliens could be sent. Islington was full and the distance of Knockaloe made it a worse alternative. The decision provoked a storm of protest from the men, their relatives and friends, the Swiss and Swedish Legations, the Jewish Authorities and various M.P.'S. The protests made were, in many cases, cogent, e.g. lack of visiting facilities, religious objections on the part of the Jews, unsuitability of the men for life under canvas. Necessity however, prevailed, but so as objections could be met they were. About 100 observant Jews were transferred to Islington where a kosher Kitchen was instituted Further, any internee who claimed to be unfit to live under canvas was given an opportunity of being medically examined, and as a consequence a number of men were sent to Belmont War Hospital till there was room for them at Islington. Continuous applications were made during June and July in person and in writing for the transfer of men to Islington, but it was impossible to favour one man against another where all could not go. Curiously enough during this period the applications for temporary releases of men on the ground of ill-health of relatives increased very largely from Frith Hill, so that such applications had to be scanned very closely. Down to the closing of the P/W Branch, they had only been granted on the grounds (A) of dangerous illness of a near relative (B) Business reasons of National Importance. They had been slightly relaxed as Peace drew nearer, but so many came in for a time that it was felt necessary to tighten them again.
By the middle of September the work of repatriating and exempting from repatriation and releasing alien enemies had so far advanced that it was found possible to close down one of the Camps.
The Frith Hill Camp had only about 150 men left, and it was considered desirable to close this Camp first. Accordingly on the 22nd September, 1919, the remainder of the P/W's there were concentrated at Islington. Shortly afterwards, it was found that the numbers at Knockaloe had fallen below 500, and as the War Office were about to complete the repatriation of the combatants interned there[?at Islington as no combatants at Knockaloe] and there was room for the balance of the civilians at Islington, instructions were therefore on the 25th September given to vacate Knockaloe and transfer the men to Islington. The actual transfer was delayed by the Railway Strike. It may be mentioned that the Government Home Office Camp at Knockaloe and the Camp at Douglas held at one time some 27,000 prisoners.
The closing down of Knockaloe left only two Home Office Camps, Libury Hall and Islington,in existence. The interned P/W's at this date numbered less than 500, and steps were taken to vacate Islington as quickly as possible. The speed at which this could be effected was necessarily dependent on the advice of Mr. Justice Younger's Committee as to repatriation and release. Considering transport difficulties, little time was lost, and by the 17th November, 1919, Islington was cleared. The only Camp now in existence is Libury Hall. It contains only old and infirm men many of whom though exempted from repatriation on the advice of the Advisory Committee prefer to stay where they are. They are not fit to look after themselves, and if sent out of the Camp would for the most part drift into the work-house They are less expensive where they are until some new arrangement can be made for the future of Libury Hall.
From May 1919 onwards, the procedure as to dealing with the claims of interned men who alleged they belonged to nations friendly to the allies continued as before. The men referred to claimed either to be Czechs, Poles, Alsatians, Italian [Irredentis?], Yugo Slavs, Roumanians and Russians. Of these all the Czechs and so called Italians had either been released or repatriated with a few isolated exceptions. About this time the Italian Information Committee dissolved. The greater proportion of the others were Poles and Polish Jews. Between the 1st May and December 1919, the cases of some 200 to 250 Poles and Polish Jews were examined of whom 73 were released on certificates granted by the Polish Consulate; about 100 men at Leeds, who were allowed to remain on licence because they claimed to be of Polish Nationality, and were doing tailoring work of importance, though not vouched Poles, were exempted by the Committee, and the remainder were sent back to Poland, in a few cases via Germany, by arrangement with the Polish Consulate, on the grounds that they were undesirable. The cases of the alleged Friendlies did not cause very much difficulty except perhaps the Alsatians. The various Legations & Committees worked most amicably with the Home Office and accepted the views of this Department upon the characters of the men concerned, practically without demur. A considerable amount of correspondence, however, has taken place about three Alsatians till lately interned at Feltham. They appeared to be in themselves undesirable characters to be allowed to remain here, At the same time they had British wives and were promised the usual French Consul's Certificates. The Alsatian League have, however, now fallen in with the views of the Home Office and arrangements have been made for two out of the three to go to France.
GERMANS. Before Armistice 5837.
since to 17th Nov.1919. 17,7346 .
; 23,571.
AUSTRIANS. Before Armistice 997
Since to 17th Nov,1919. 4,037.
5,034.
TURKS. Before Armistice 2
Since to 17th Nov.1919. 110.
112
BULGARIANS. Before Armistice 4
Since to 17th Nov.1919. 23
27.
GRAND TOTAL, 28,744
In addition 1600 invalid Germans were transferred
to Holland under the Hague agreement
May 1919
Germans 283
Austrians 127
Others 6
416
July 1919
Germans 119
Austrians 46
165
August 1919
Germans 189
Austrians 72
Others 4
265
Sept. 1919.
Germans. 49.
Austrians. 27
Poles. 3
79
Oct. 1919.
Germans. 34
Austrians. 24.
58.
Nov.1919.
Germans. 5
Austrians. 1
6.
Total
Germans repatriated between lst May and 17th November 1919. 679
Austrians 297
Others 13
Grand total 989
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