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[Extracted from HO 45/11025/410118]
Included in this Home Office file is a very long and detailed report, over 140 pages of typescript, on the section of the War Office that concerned itself with Prisoners of War both Combatant and Civilians - the preserved copy was sent, presumably for comments, to the Home Office department that had overall charge of near 2/3rds of civilian internments due to its responsibility for the two Manx Camps and the two, somewhat exceptional, Islington and Libury Hall Camps.
The comments from the Home Office officials on the cover were somewhat mocking:
Copy of Note attached to Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War, File 410118
Sir E. Troup
Have you seen this Magnum opus?
It is wonderful that W.O. did so much and H.O. so little indeed we may fairly argue that the present W.O. effort to make H.O. undertake all interned civilian business next tine is condemned out of W.O, own mouth. J.P. (Intlld) 24/11.20.
Sir J. Pedder.
Yes - As the H.O. blows no trumpets, it gets ittle notice Islington and Libury Hall are not even mentioned as far as I can see. But what has happened about the H.O. Memo, I think we ought to have one - running to 6 pages instead of 140. Our experience is quite worth recording and may have more weight than that of W.O. if it is compressed in a few pages.
I think in the next war the H.O, might well take the whole responsibility for civilian prisoners, provided it is given power to commandeer and to appoint Commandants and guards with full military powers. (intlld.) C.E.T. 6.12.20
Though the question of making the report public was raised in the Commons it was decided not to to publish it -
Sir J. D. Rees, - To ask the Under Secretary of State for War, whether the Reports of the Directorate of Prisonors of War and of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau will be published. (Wednesday 22nd December [1920]. ) .
Sir J. D. REES asked the Secretary of State for War whether the Reports of the Directorate of Prisoners of War and of the Prisoners of War Information Bureau will be published?
Sir A. WILLIAMSON: The question of publishing these Reports has been carefully considered, and it has been decided that it would not be desirable, nor in the public interest, to publish them. They are a compilation of detailed notes prepared for Departmental use and reference in the event of any future emergency.
Lord Newton, who had been in charge of the Home Office branch for much of the war raised this point in the Lords - two pages from Hansard 17 Feb 1921are also included in the file
PRISONERS OF WAR DIRECTORATE.
Lord NEWTON : My Lords, I desire to ask the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he will consider the advisability of publishing the Report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War. This is a very able Report, which was prepared in the War Office. It explains in great detail the methods which were employed in dealing with the hundreds of thousands of prisoners of various nationalities who were in our custody, and, to some extent, the steps taken to protect British prisoners in the hands of the enemy. I suggest its publication for the following reasons. Everybody who fulfilled any public office during the war was naturally subjected to considerable criticism, but it will not be disputed that no persons were so generally abused as those who were concerned with prisoners of war. "Incompetence" was the mildest charge made, and it is no exaggertion to state that practically every crime was alleged, except perhaps that of having been personally responsible for the capture of the prisoners themselves. The War Office, itself an institution which seldom meets with any favourable criticism was also charged with being so impregnated with pro-Germanism that not only did it neglect British prisoners with particular callousness and brutality, but it extended clemency to German prisoners and connived at their leading a life of luxurious ease.
The most malicious and mischievous charge brought against the Government was that in consequence of this attitude British prisoners were in a worse situation than those of any other nationality. I am under the impression that many people in this country still believe that and are firmly convinced that all these ridiculous statements were true. They believe that the interests of British prisoners were completely neglected, and are convinced that the case of enemy prisoners was studied to the utmost extent. Were this document published the absurdity of all these charges and accusations would at at once become apparent. The public would then realise not only the great difficulties with which the Government were faced in dealing with prisoners of war and the protection of their own compatriots, but also the immense efforts which they made, the heavy expense incurred and the infinite trouble taken by all concerned in the interests of the prisoners. They would also be able to realise — and I should like to emphasise this point — the fact that if the German prisoners under the charge of the War Office were not employed as they ought to have been the fault did not rest with the War Office, but with the Trade Unions. It is a lamentable and disgraceful fact that for the first eighteen months of the war no prisoners were employed at all in consequence of the opposition of the Trade Unions, and this at a time when our men were being worked almost to death in Germany, Turkey, and esleswhere. When the demand for labour grew so great that it was impossible entirely to oppose the employment of these prisoners of war, and when British prisoners were being literally worked to death in German salt and coal mines and in Turkey, not a single prisoner in our hands was ever put underground, on account of the determined opposition of the Trade Unions. I have always thought that this was a fact which should be more generally known and that, at all events, the War Office should be cleared of that particular charge.
I learn somewhat to my surprise that there are objections to the publication of this Report. It is stated in the first place that as it is addressed to the Adjutant General, instead of to the Army Council, there is some objection on that ground I dismiss that reason as altogether frivolous The second objection is that it is a matter of purely Departmental interest that the Report was merely prepared as a guide to procedure in the event of another war That objection does not seem to be a very strong one, either, because it is more than a matter of Departmental interest. It is one in which great interest was taken by the public at the time. The third reason given is that the Foreign Office has raised objections, I presume on account of allusions to foreign Governments. I venture to express some doubt as to whether the Foreign Office has ever read the Report at all. My impression is that the Foreign Office is so much occupied with its own business that it has not much time in which to read the Reports of other Departments.
I have read this document, which is supposed to be highly confidential, and I am unable to see any reason why it should not be published. It is true that the susceptibilities of certain Powers might be slightly affected. it is also true that there are uncomplimentary expressions in the Report with regard to the procedure of the German Government and the Turkish Government, but those Governments must be used to hostile criticism by now, and no great harm can be done in that way. Anybody reading the Report carefully will realise that, if it is a question of Allied Governments, the obviously apparent fact is that the British Government took infinitely more trouble with regard to its prisoners than any of our Allies. That may be unpalatable to some people, but it does not seem to me an adequate reason why the facts should be concealed here.
I recognise — I should be very foolish if I did not — that this is not an important matter, and I do not raise it from any personal point of view, because, as a matter of fact, I had absolutely no share in the compilation of this Report. The activities of the Department over which I presided are only slightly alluded to. I am really making this suggestion in the interests of the War Office itself and that I find the official attitude [lost due to torn corner]
I have selected the sections of the report that deal with or had an impact on Civilian Internment.
[To] Adjutant-General.
I forward herewith a report on the Directorate of Prisoners of War from August, 1914, until the end of February, 1920, when the repatriation of all enemy prisoners of war, with the exception of about 55,000 Turks, had been virtually completed. The scope of the report is given in Section 7 of Chapter I. I have endeavoured to secure accuracy by submitting a preliminary draft of certain sections to Departments of State and other branches of the War Office when this appeared to be necessary. The measures that experience suggests should first be taken on the outbreak of a war of any magnitude are given in the preface.
H. E. BELFIELD, Lieutenant-General, Director of Prisoners of War. The War Orrice, 26th March, 1920.
On the assumption that the Royal Warrant for the Maintenance of Discipline among Prisoners of War is up to date, experience shows that the steps to be first taken on the outbreak of a war of considerable magnitude are as follows :-
1. Establish an organization at the War Office to deal with all matters regarding prisoners of war. It will probably suffice if a small staff is at first provided as a branch of an existing Directorate (Section 1, Chapter I., and Section 1, Chapter VII.)
2. Prepare separate camps or buildings for the reception of officers, other ranks and (if necessary) civilians. Among the most important of these are camps of transit for officers and other ranks at a port suitable for the disembarkation of prisoners of war. Covered accommodation will be required during the winter months. A canteen should opened in each camp (Section 2, Chapter III., and Sections 1, 8 and 9, Chapter VII.).
3. If civilians are to be interned it will be necessary to define early the responsibilities ot the War Office and of other Departments of State concerned (Section 3, Chapter I., and Section 3, Chapter VII).
4. Establish an Information Bureau (Section 5, Chapter III).
5. Establish a branch where all records of British prisoners of war shall be dealt with. This was undertaken by the Casualty Branch of the War Office.
6. Arrange for medical treatment both in hospitals and camps (Section 13, Chapter VII.).
7. Arrange for the confinement, of officers and other ranks when under punishment (Section 6, Chapter VII.).
8. Issue Standing Orders, unless these are embodied in the "Rules" of the Royal Warrant, and arrange for their promulgation in camps in the language of the prisoners (Section 2, Chapter VI.).
9. Issue orders as to-
Accounting (Section 15, Chapter VII.). Censorship (Section 7, Chapter III.). : Correspondence (Section 7, Chapter III.). Impoundment of certain articles (Section 7, Chapter VIL). Rates of pay to be issued under existing Conventions (Section 8, Chapter III.). Rations (Section 2, Chapter II.). Responsibility for guarding (Section 5, Chapter VII.).
The work of the Directorate, which was instituted in September, 1914, was divided into two main divisions, viz., the custody and control of all enemy prisoners of war wherever captured or interned, and care for the interests of British prisoners im enemy countries. Each of these, again, fell naturally into the two sub-divisions of combatants (naval, military and air personnel) and civilians.
Every Power has been inclined, as a measure of retaliation, to impose on prisoners in its hands any stringent regulation which may have been imposed by an enemy on those in its custody. It was therefore necessary when framing any regulation to consider how its enforcement in, probably, very different circumstances might affect British prisoners. For this reason the concentration of the two main branches of the work in one Directorate has certainly proved its value.
The main difficulty from the first was the entire lack of experience or precedent.
Nothing was to be gained from a study of the conditions which obtained. and the regulations which were in force during the second half of the 18th century and the early years of the 19th - the last period when England held prisoners in considerable numbers. Times had changed, ideas of propriety and uprightness were different and there were than no Conventions by which States had bound themselves in regard to the conduct of war and especially the treatment of prisoners. The record our treatment of the Frenchmen, Americans, Dutchmen and Spaniards who were in our custody during this period, though in some ways, perhaps, better than that of our enemies, was such as to give us cause for shame, and it is probable that had the true facts come to light at the time there would have been a great outcry in the country.
It is interesting to note how history made over a century ago has repeated itself.
The French Press accused us of gross brutality towards prisoners, and the Times retorted by extolling our humanity, and ascribed these charges solely to the French desire for propaganda which should inspire general hatred of us The English and French accused one another of failure to comply with the terms for the exchange of prisoners; both claiming that whereas they had sent back healthy men, they had received only broken down invalids in return. Conferences were held from time to time for the betterment of conditions, but the delegates met on belligerent, not neutral ground. Then, as durings the last few years, a vast amount of correspondence passed between belligerents on the subject of prisoners of war; little good, however, seems to have resulted from it.
On the outbreak of the war the only "text books" on the subject of prisoners of war were the Geneva Convention of 1906, as regards medical personnel and chaplains. Section I. of the Annex to the 4th Hague Convention of 1907, Chapter II. of the 5th Hague Convention of 1907 (with the explanatory notes to all the above in the Manual of Military Law), a few sections in Chapter XIV. of the Field Service Regulations, Part II., and the Royal Warrant of 3rd August, 1914. It was on the precepts and regulations contained in these publications, and in some cases, as will be explained later, in contravention of them, that the elaborate system of administration, developed during an experience of over 5 years, was built up
The number of Departments of State concerned in greater or less degree with the question of prisoners of war complicated matters from the start.
Control of all aliens in the United Kingdom was the concern of the Home Office in accordance with the policy of the Government, took steps for the arrest of those enemy civilians who were to be interned, arrangements for their accommodation and custody rested with the War Office. For some 6 months of the winter and sping of 1914-15 the Prisoners of War Directorate was responsible for deciding whether an individual should be exempted from internment, interned or released, a small staff being lent from the Home Office for this purpose; but this procedure was abandoned in May, 1915, when it was decided that all such questions should be dealt with by the Home Secretary, who was assisted by an Advisory Committee specially set up to investigate each case, Close touch between the Home Office and the War Office, and especially with the contre-espionage branches of the Admiralty and the War Office, was found to be essential
Tho Colonial and India Offices were responsible in the early stages of the war for action being taken against enemy aliens in the Dominions, the Colonies and India on lines generally similar to those adopted in the United Kingdom.
All questions regarding the treatment of enemies, whether combatant or civilians, interned in the Dominions or in those Colonies where there is no Military Governor passed through the Colonial Office, which also acted as the channel for the communication to the Dominions and Colonies under civil administration of Army Council Instructions and regulations issued by the War Office regarding prisoners of war. As the war progressed the Colonial Office was largely concerned in all questions regarding the German colonies which had fallen into British hands, and especially so when the administration had been taken over by civil authorities.
The India Office dealt with the internment in India and Burma of enemy civilians interned by the local authorities and of prisoners transferred from elsewhere, e.g., Turks : from Mesopotamia and civilian and combatant Germans from East Africa. Owing to representations by the Indian authorities, German combatants captured in East Africa and male civilians of military age resident there were, after July, 1917, sent to Eygpt, other civilians being held in the conquered territory until they could be repatriated. The India Office was immediately concerned in the treatment of native Indians of all ranks and classes who fell into the hands of the enemy.
Concern for members of the Mercantile Marine was shared by the Admiralty and the Board of Trade. The former were especially interested in the status accorded by hostile Governments to the crews of defensively armed merchant ships, whom the enemy persisted in regarding as combatants, whereas the British Government contended that, in conformity with all precedent, they should be regarded as civilians. The latter, as the Department specially charged with the interests of the Mercantile Marine, were concerned with the treatment they received while prisoners of war.
The Admiralty and Air Ministry were concerned in all questions of policy affecting Naval and Aerial operations, with all prisoners of war of the enemies' Naval and Air Services in our hands and with the treatment accorded by the enemy to those of their services who had been taken prisoner.
The War Office was responsible for :-
The control and custody of all prisoners of war in the United Kingdom. The large camps in the Isle of Man, where two-thirds of the interned civilians were located, were, however, to a considerable extent under the control of the Home Office. This will be referred to later.
The issue of all orders, except those of local application, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war throughout the Empire.
A general supervision of all camps and an immediate supervision of those in the United Kingdom.
The policy on a matters regarding prisoners of war so far as military operations were affected.
The interests of British military prisoners of war in enemy countries.
The Foreign Office specially concerned itself with the care of civilians of British nationality in enemy countries. Either on its own initiative or at the instance of other Departments it was the channel of communication with enemy, allied and neutral states. A few questions were, however, settled directly between the military authorities of allied states.
Although the conduct of affairs was not unsatisfactory, there was a lack of unity of purpose and action among the various Departments. It was recognized that the War Office was more concerned than any other Department, not only on account of the results on military operations of decisions on matters of policy regarding prisoners of war, but also because the great majority of British prisoners in enemy hands were soldiers. Its opinion was, therefore, allowed a predominating weight and no step of any moment was taken without its concurrence. Conferences. attended by representatives of various Departments, were called from time to time by the Foreign Office and the War Office, At these conferences the Admiralty and the War Office generally adopted the same attitude on any question of policy under discussion. The result of this policy on the successful and speedy termination of the war was to them of supreme importance to which all other considerations must be subservient, and this did not always commend itself to other Departments. There was, however, no deciding authority in case of divergence of views except the Cabinet, to which there was reluctance to refer questions not of first rate importance ; but without this authority the Foreign Oftice hesitated to take action in, and to be held responsible for carrying out, any line of policy with which they were not in accord.
In order to remedy this state of affairs, the War Committee of the Cabinet, in October, 1916, decided to create a Prisoners of War Department under a Controller, who should have general supervision of all questions and authority to communicate with Foreign Governments in the name of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on all matters regarding prisoners of war. This new Department also took over the interests of British civilians in enemy countries. The Controller was assisted by an Inter-Departmental Committee composed of representatives of the various Departments concerned, Under this procedure questions were dealt with more satisfactorily and speedily than had hitherto been the case, but the Controller lacked authority to give a decision when the views of the Departments were, and after full discussion remained, at variance, and had to submit the matter in dispute to the War Committee (later the War Cabinet).
With the object of reaching speedy decisions on questions which were not of first rate importance, a Minister of Cabinet rank was appointed as Chairman of the Inter-Departmental Committee in September, 1918. He performed these duties, which were at times onerous, in addition to those of his permanent office. On this reconstituted Committee the Prisoners of War Department was represented only as were other Departments of State. The Dominions were also represented. The termination of hostilities in November, 1918, and the repatriation of prisoners of war from enemy countries, which it controlled, relieved the Committee of nearly the whole of the work on which it had previously been engaged.
The above is a short summary of the subjects regarding prisoners of war in which particular Departments were interested and the steps taken to co-ordinate their views. But, in addition to these, the Food Controller was frequently consulted in regard to the feeding of prisoners of war in our hands, and he rendered valuable assistance to those charged with the despatch of food to British prisoners. Questions of the despatch of food and goods from this and neutral countries to British prisoners were submitted to the Minister of Blockade; and when in the winter of 1918-19 the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war had to be undertaken and, later, when the repatriation of enemy prisoners was in question, the War Office was in constant communication with the Ministry of Shipping.
The allotment of the labour of prisoners of war in the United Kingdom was taken over by the Minister of National Service when that Ministry was formed; and on its abolition this duty fell on the Ministry of Labour. The War Office merely supplied labour, as far as possible, to the extent and of the nature required, but remained responsible for the maintenance and the custody of the prisoners.
Other organizations which were concerned in prisoners of war were :-
The Information Bureau, created in accordance with Article 14 of the Hague Convention to compile a complete record of all prisoners of war in British hands, to deal the enquiries regarding them, and to collect the personal effects of enemy dead. This bureau, though largely independent, carried on its duties in close touch with the War Office.
The "Government Committee on the Treatment by the Enemy of British Prisoners of War," which obtained statements from repatriated prisoners; and on these, supplemented with information from other Sources, published reports on various subjects from time to time. In order that evidence might be properly sifted, the constitution of this Committee was largely legal. It reported to the Foreign Office or (later) to the Prisoners of War Department,
The "Central Prisoners of War Committee" of the British Red Cross Society which was concerned with the despatch of supplies to British prisoners of war. It could take no step of importance without the concurrence of the War Office.
It is understood that each of the above organizations will render a report.
It was not, however, the lack of experience and the want of co-ordination among the various Departments which alone made the task of all connected with prisoners of war a dificult one The brutalities of the Germans, especially in the earliest stages of the war; the story of the typhus epidemic at Wittenberg ; the accounts that reached this country of life in German camps, and in particular the treatment of British prisoners whom the Germans employed in the occupied portions of Russia, France and Belgium, raised the most intense feeling against Germans throughout the Empire, and this was constantly kept at fever heat by the stories, sometimes much exaggerated, told by repatriated prisoners and those transferred to Switzerland and Holland. A very large number of questions were asked in Parliament and debates, especially in the House of Lords, were not infrequent. Letters constantly appeared in the papers The public mind was directed not only to German brutalities but to the very different treatment which, according to certain members of Parliament and many writers, was accorded to prisoners in this country, and which was much resented. The allegations as regards treatment of prisoners in our hands were absurdly exaggerated, but in spite of reports by all who visited camps in the United Kingdom, among whom were delegates of the House of Commons, to the effect that strict discipline was maintained and reasonable conditions of internment prevailed, the public refused to be convinced.
This excited public opinion was, in the circumstances, perhaps not unnatural. Although to a great extent regardless of military considerations it made itself felt on every side and had to be taken into account when any question of policy was involved. The War Office was severely criticised at times for supposed lack of humanity in strongly opposing suggestions put forward for the alleviation of the lot of British prisoners of war, especially the civilians, of whom some 4,000 were held in Germany which were seriously disadvantageous from a military point of view.
It was extremely difficult to maintain a consistent and well-considered line of policy in the face of this popular clamour, which at times almost called for vengeance on German prisoners in our hands - a course which would have been out of keeping with British traditions and unwise as tending to reduce the amount of productive labour which was obtained from men working under reasonably good conditions.
Resentment against the treatment of British prisoners elsewhere than in Germany and anxiety for their fate was a much less potent factor in influencing opinion amongst the general public, as the numbers involved were much smaller than those in Germany. There was, however, every, reason for extreme anxiety for those interned in Turkey where the conditions were disgraceful. Carelessness, callousness, lack of organizing power, often sheer brutality, the breakdown of communications (whereby letters and parcels were most unduly delayed and often lost) and oriental indifference wrought terrible havoc among prisoners in Turkey. A very large number of deaths occurred among our men, in addition to those who perished from starvation and brutality during the march northwards after the surrender of Kut-el-Amara.
With the object of making a record for future use, comments are made on certain Articles of the Geneva Convention, on the relevant portions of the second Peace Conference of 1907 at the Hague, on Field Service Regulations, Part II, and on the Royal Warrant of 3rd August, 1914 These are followed by reference to various other matters which have come to the front during 5 years and which, while seeming to be worthy of record, have not been covered when dealing with the Conventions and the Royal Warrant.
It may be stated at the outset that this covers but a portion, and in some respects the less important portion, of the work of the Directorate of Prisoners of War, which was concerned as much in watching the interests of British prisoners of war in hostile countries as in dealing with prisoners in our hands. The correspondence on the former subject, probably as regards bulk and certainly as regards importance and complexity was considerably greater than on the latter. A record of this part of the work would seem to have little practical value for the future. Nearly the whole of the correspondence was conducted through the Foreign Office, or, after October, 1916, the Prisoners of War Department. Detailed reference to British prisoners of war is, therefore, made only when considering the 5th Hague Convention, which deals with the rights and duties of neutrals.
The two final sections of the chapter on miscellaneous subjects deal with the release, exchange and repatriation of prisoners of war and with the arrangements made in this country for the despatch of clothing to British prisoners. They necessarily include matters somewhat outside the scope of this report as above limited. The former, especially the portions bearing on exchange and repatriation, is largely a condensed account of steps taken mainly on behalf of British prisoners. The latter deals with the interests of British prisoners alone.
....
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(a.) War Office— In the early days of the war the Directorate of Prisoners of War was concerned almost entirely with prisoners in this country, as, in addition to the large number of civilians who had been interned (the decision in each particular case resting as before explained, with the Directorate), all prisoners captured in France were sent here. A small staff only was then required, but the work extended rapidly, covering main questions of principle regarding prisoners of war throughout the Empire and very many concerning British prisoners in enemy countries. The work had always been novel; it became heavy and responsible.
Ignoring the necessity for an increase of staff wherewith to cope with an increase of work, and notwithstanding several strong representations which merely stated absolute requirements, every financial obstacle was raised to the provision of an adequate staff, and it may be said that until the beginning of 1918 the work could be carried on (and then not as fully as was advisable) only by imposing a greater strain on the Directorate than was justifiable even under conditions of war.
On the appointment of a General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Home Forces, the charge of prisoners in the United Kingdom should, logically, have been handed over to him, It would then have been possible to refer to him any question regarding prisoners in this country in the same manner as in the case of those in France, India, Malta and elsewhere. After full consideration it was thought to be unadvisable to alter the existing procedure, and the question was solved, though unsatisfactorily, by the appointment of an Assistant Director to the staff of the Directorate. This officer virtually took charge of all camps in this country and the employment of the prisoners, relieving the Director of a vast amount of detail. for which, however, he remained responsible.
The staff of the Directorate of Prisoners of War on 11th November, 1918 — the date of the Armistice with Germany — together with the distribution of duties, and certain comments, is given in Appendix 14.
(b.) Camps. (1.) Establishments and rates of pay.— Owing to the different conditions under which prisoners of war were interned in the various parts of the Empire, it was practically impossible to lay down any scale of numbers to be employed universally on the staff of camps. The local military authority put forward recommendations for an establishment, and each case was considered on its merits. In the Dominions and India the matter rested solely with the local Governments.
The establishment of camp staffs in the United Kingdom was the subject of many revisions. These took final shape in Army Council Instruction 1090 of 1917, a copy of which appears in Appendix 15.
Selected prisoners of war were sometimes employed in clerical duties of an unimportant nature in camps. Under adequate supervision they also dealt with all postal matters in "parent" camps. This was a heavy task, as these "parents" were frequently the sorting offices for all letters and parcels addressed to men in affliated working camps, and bore on their books a number of prisoners 10 to 15 times greater than the accommodation of the camp — e.g., Dorchester, with accommodation for only 3,800 prisoners, had 42,000 on their books. During the spring of 1919 Pattishall, with an even greater discrepancy between accommodation and those affiliated to it, had to deal with an average of 233,000 incoming and 98,000 outgoing letters each month, as well as with 48,000 incoming parcels. Of the incoming letters and parcels about two- thirds had to be re-addressed and despatched to affiliated working camps.
...
The general principles adopted for the internment of enemy civilians in this country and overseas have been outlined in the introductory chapter. The only questions of moment regarding them which reached the War Office were in connection with those interned in the United Kingdom.
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(a.) Administration of camps in the United Kingdom.— As mentioned in Section 2 (d) of Chapter II, a number of camps and ships were prepared for the reception of civilian prisoners early in the war. In order to clear the ships which were very expensive and unsatisfactory, the Home Office opened a camp at Douglas in the Isle of Man and commenced the construction of a second camp on the island at Knockaloe, which, when completed, had accommodation for nearly 25,000. Civilian Prisoners began to move to the island camps from the ships in the spring of 1915, leaving eventually, only three camps for Civilians in England — at Wakefield, Stratford, and in the Alexandra Palace, and one at Oldcastle in Ireland.
All such camps, except those in the Isle of Man, were administered by the War Office precisely as camps for combatants, but the island camps were under a dual control to which we were committed from the first. It was never satisfactory. The Home Office administered these camps through the Island Government, but the main staff was a military one, and the guarding duties were necessarily preformed by soldiers. Grave irregularities and much misunderstanding resulted from the lack of unity of control. After a considerable correspondence and several conferences, the Home Office and the War Office arranged that the latter should be responsible for the guarding, disciplinary control and sanitation of the camps, as well as for censorship, while the former should undertake the upkeep of the camp buildings and their equipment, and the installations for lighting and water supply, the provision of food and clothing, and the management of the canteens. The Commandant and staff for the military services were supplied by the War Office, the Home Office staff being entirely civilian. All correspondence between the Home Office authorities and the civilian staff of camps passed through the hands of Commandants, who were thus acquainted with all that was going on, and they were authorized to comment on it. They could also bring to the notice of their military superiors anything which they considered detrimental to the maiatenance of discipline. The military supervision of both camps was under a Brigadier-General, whe was also in command of all troops on the island.
It was an unsatisfactory, makeshift, arrangement which worked on account of the good will and tact with which it was handled and in spite of its many shortcomings. It should never be repeated. Either the War Office or the Home Office should have been solely responsible but as the latter had no force at its disposal for guarding the prisoners and no powers under military law to deal with them, it is difficult to see how this responsibility could have been borne by any Department other than the War Office; which, however, would gladly have shifted it to other shoulders.
After May, 1915, the Home Office was responsible for the release of civilians interned in the United Kingdom, and for the selection of prisoners for repatriation or for internment in Holland as invalids under The Hague Agreement of 1917. As a number of them had been resident in, and some of them held property in, this country, a large number of legal and other questions arose with which the Home Office had to deal. At the discretion of the Home Office, individual civilian prisoners of war in any camp were permitted to write letters of greater length and frequency, and to receive visitors in excess of these permitted by the regulations for other camps. The Home Office regulated the employment in the island of all prisoners in the Isle of Man camps. When employed outside the Isle of Man the War Office was entirely responsible for them.
(b.) Exchange — Regardless of the military disadvantages of such a course, a number of people in this country who were concerned in the lot of the British civilians interned in Germany frequently urged that, as the German Government had refused to operate a man-for-man exchange, a comprehensive echange should be effected of all German civilians interned in the United Kingdom for all British civilians interned in Germany.
The great disparity of numbers. We held about 29,000 German civilians in the United Kingdom of whom the greater number would, probably, elect for return to their native land, whereas there were only some 4,000 British civilians interned in Germany.
The Germans were all of military age, most of them reservists, and in good health owing to the conditions under which they were held. We had every reason to doubt the military value of the British in Germany and, besides, they were exempted from conscription under the Military Service Act.
A Committee which considered the question in March, 1917, reported :-
"Any increase of the resources in man-power of the Central Powers must tend to prolong the war, and as the war is to a great extent one of attrition, the best and really most humane course to follow is to place and keep out of action a many of the enemy as possible.
Taking all the circumstances into consideration, and more especially in view of the disparity of the numbers involved, the proposal of a general exchange of interned civilians should not, in the interests of the State, be entertained."
These conclusions were adopted by a Committee which again considered the question in February, 1918.
Arrangements for an exchange of all civilians, the balance in favour of Germany being compensated by the repatriation of British combatants, were concluded during the Conference at The Hague in 1918, but this did not become operative owing to the conclusion of the Armistice with Germany (see Articles 3 et seq. of Appendix 2)
(c.) Questionable advantage of retention.— It is open to argument whether the military advantages gained by the retention of these men was an adequate compensation for the expense involved, and the loss of the services of officers and men who were necessarily employed during 5 years in administering and guarding the camps.
Prisoners, such as Alsatians, Poles, Schleswig-Holsteiners, Czechs, &c., who, though interned or captured as enemies, belonged to races whose national aspirations could be fulfilled only by the victory of the Allies, were, if interned in the United Kingdom, collected in a special camp at Feltham.
Each of these races was represented in this country by a committee, who were afforded all reasonable facilities for ascertaining the views of prisoners. But as long as the outcome of the war was in doubt, many hesitated to come forward from fear of the true German element in the ordinary camps and the steps that might be taken against their families if information reached their Governments of any disloyalty on their part.
It was, therefore, only with the greatest difficulty that the sentiments of individuals could be ascertained.
When at Feltham they were treated as ordinary prisoners of war, the same amount of labour being required of them, but the freedom of communication with their national representatives, liberty to speak their own language and express their political views, and relief at being removed from German tyranny were most welcome to them. It was the only camp which held both combatant and civilian prisoners of war.
In France and elsewhere such prisoners were collected and dealt with on similar lines, so far as circumstances permitted.
The transfer of men of these nationalities to the French authorities, in the case of Alsatian-Lorrainers, and to other Governments when formed, is referred to in Section 17 of this chapter.
The responsibility for guarding prisoners of war in the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, rested with the local military authority. The War Office issued no orders on the subject. But in order to avoid any question of division of responsibility between the Commandant of a camp and the Officer Commanding the guarding troops, it was laid down that, in this country, the former was responsible for the safe custody of prisoners to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief the Command in which his camp was situated. The Officer Commanding the guarding troops was responsible for the execution of the orders of the Commandant and for the discipline, administration and training of the troops. The two duties were combined in small camps.
Sentries were posted outside the wire enclosure of a camp.
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(d.) Civilian prisoners of war.— "Camp leaders" were selected from the prisoners of war in civilian camps. Orders were conveyed through these men, to whom some minor privileges were conceded, and they were held responsible for the general good conduct of their sections. The prisoners were subject to the military code, but the discipline in these camps was, naturally, not as good as that which could be maintained among combatants. All punishments were recorded.
(e) Civilian labourers.— Civilian labourers, who were necessarily employed at times in internment camps, were a source of some anxiety to camp staffs. They, unless watched very carefully, occasionally took letters from prisoners out of camps and introduced letters or unauthorized articles. They were doubtless paid for their services.
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(g.) Special remission of punishments.— The British and German delegates, during the Conference at The Hague in June and July, 1917, agreed that "The execution of all punishments inflicted on combatant and civilian prisoners of war on account of offences and crimes which have been committed between the date of capture and the 1st August next will be remitted until the conclusion of peace" (see paragraphs 18 and 19 of Appendix 1). The expression "until the conclusion of peace" was insisted on by the Germans as, according to them, an absolute remission of punishment demanded the personal signature of the Kaiser in each case. A note was made at the time that this expression was to be considered as merely formal. It will be observed that the remission of punishments does not extend to those convicted of war crimes.
(h.) Stoppage of privileges. — It often proved easier to maintain discipline through the privileges granted to prisoners of war than by means of the ordinary forms of punishment. The mere threat to withdraw a privilege, such as exercise outside camp limits in the case of officers or permission to hold entertainments, generally brought men to reason.
The imposition of restriction on correspondence (see Appendix 8) was a potent weapon against individuals.
Tbe orders on the subject are given in Appendix 19. All impounded articles of private property, with the exception of the civilian clothing of any one interned in an officers' camp, which was stored locally, were sent to the Information Bureau for safe custody. Telescopes and field-glasses which were not private property were sent to the Ordnance Stores at Woolwich for disposal.
Oils, scents and chemicals were specially forbidden
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(2.) Measures to prevent escape from the country after escape from a camp had been effected — Prompt notification and publicity were the measures on which reliance was mainly based to prevent the escape of a prisoner from the country.
A full deseription of each prisoner, from which the blank telegraph form in Appendix 21 could be completed, was entered on his camp index card. In concurrence with the Home Office, it was arranged that the commandant of the camp from which a prisoner of war had escaped should at once inform the Chief Constable of the county in which the camp was situated and should send a similar notification to the Home Office, the headquarters of the Metropolitan Police and the headquarters of the Command.
The chief constable first notified at once communicated with the chief constables of adjoining counties and any other authorities suggested by the particular circumstances of the case. All telegrams on the subject were accepted free of charge by the postal authorities.
The Home Office notified all coast counties and all ports and other boroughs on the coast having separate police forces. They also communicated with the Railway Executive Committee, who notified all railway companies. Police forces on the coast were responsible for communicating the intelligence to the Aliens officer and Customs officer at any port, to the port or harbour police the coast-guard and to the senior military officer at the port.
The Metropolitan Police communicated a full description of the man and other relevant details to the Press, and a notice also appeared in the Police Gazette.
It was no easy matter to escape; but, in addition to the three officers above- mentioned. four of other ranks and five civilians effected it. It was a comparatively easy matter for civilians, especially those that spoke English fluently, as they were not clothed in any distinctive dress, except when employed in working companies (see Section VIII. of Appendix 6).
A large amount of baggage was sent to this country with men taken prisoner in West Africa. This and any other surplus baggage was stored by the Information Bureau.
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Various orders were issued from time to time to curtail the amount of luggage which prisoners naturally accumulate during a lengthy internment and to minimize the demands on railways, both in this and foreign. countries, through which prisoners might he travelling, either on repatriation or on their transfer to a neutral country The latest of these orders is given in Appendix 22
Numerous claims have been received from prisoners of war on account of baggage lost or tampered with during transport. While many of these claims were unquestionably fraudulent or much exaggerated, others were no doubt well founded No satisfactory system was devised to ensure the safety of baggage on such occasions especially when, as often happened, its charge was transferred to different authorities during a long journey. Enemy baggage was treated with no respect by some through whose hands it passed.
(a.) In hospital, — A hospital was opened at Dartford in September, 1915, solely for the treatment of combatant and civilian prisoners of war, in which proper precautions to prevent escape, to ensure the censorship of correspondence and the many other special conditions of a prisoners of war camp could be enforced. As all sick and wounded prisoners who were likely to require treatment for more than a few days were sent to this country from France as soon as they were fit to travel, it was soon necessary to extend this accommodation, and at the date of the Armistice with Germany seven hospitals, with 8,800 beds, were entirely set apart for the treatment of prisoners. In exceptional cases, men requiring treatment were sent to an ordinary military or civil hospital until fit to be moved to one of the assigned hospitals or to an internment camp.
Necessary operations only were undertaken; others were postponed. Special arrangements were made for the observation of prisoners convalescent from typhoid fever or dysentery, and for those requiring prolonged treatment by massage. electricity or mechanical apparatus. Spectacles were supplied on payment. Medical records and a medical history sheet were kept for all prisoners treated in hospitals.
In addition to these large hospitals, each camp had a hospital, with beds to the number of about 2 per cent. of the total accommodation, for the treatment of minor and urgent cases ; but this percentage varied with the distance of the camp from a main hospital In small working camps first-aid appliances were, as a rule, supplied, and recourse was had to the services of the local doctor.
An insane civilian prisoner of war was remoyed to an asylum in accordance with the laws of the country. If he had been a resident in this country before internment he was, if possible, transferred to the asylum of the district in which he had previously lived. If the patient's means were such as not to call for treatment at the public expense he could be sent, in consultation with the proper authorities, to some suitable institution. Insane combatant prisoners were transferred to specified hospitals. The question of the repatriation of the patient was taken up as soon as insanity had been established.
Before despatch to a civil hospital or a lunatic asylum a man and all his goods were carefully searched, as it was impossible to ensure adequate disciplinary control of prisoners in these circumstances. The regulations in regard to the correspondence of prisoners of war in these establishments are given in Section 14 of Appendix 7.
Officers were charged 3s. a day when in hospital. Those of other ranks were treated without charge except that medical personnel, as they received pay, were charged as British troops. All received precisely the same treatment as our own men.
(b.) Dental treatment.— After considerable correspondence an agreement (see Appendix 23) was concluded with enemy Governments regarding the dental treatment of prisoners of war. It was made applicable throughout the Empire.
(c.) Employment of captured medical personnel and interned civil practitioners. — The employment of military medical personnel has been referred to in Section 2 of Chapter II.
An interned civil practitioner, when employed professionally with prisoners of war. was granted pay at 10s. a day if rationed or 12s. 6d. without rations. So far as circumstances allowed he was treated as an officer while so employed.
It came to notice during 1917 that the German authorities had placed restrictions on the issue of powers of attorney by prisoners of war. Corresponding steps were accordingly taken, in consultation with the Treasury, which narrowly limited the matters with which any power of attorney issued by a German prisoner might deal The instructions issued on this subject, as revised in October, 1918 age given in Appendix 24.
In December, 1917, the Postal Censor called attention to the number of letters written by prisoners to relatives and friends requesting that the accounts of fellow prisoners might be credited in Germany with sums which represented moneys borrowed from them by the writers As the transfer of funds from one person to another in an enemy country by a person in the United Kingdom, except by virtue of a Treasury licence, was a contravention of the laws regarding trading with the enemy, all such letters were stopped A general Treasury licence was issued subsequent whereby prisoners in serious need of funds were enabled to arrange for the repayment in Germany of any sum, not exceeeing 10/-, borrowed from a fellow prisoner.
The regulations regarding remittances by prisoners of war are given in Section 11 (with the attached notes) of Appendix 7.
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(a) To Allies.. — It was decided in the early days of the war that prisoners of war should not be transferred as such to an Ally owing to the fear that reprisals might be taken on our men. We might then find them handed about indiscriminate among our enemies, when their lot would be very hard, and there. would be the greatest difficulty in keeping in touch with them. "It was a wise decision, which was strictly maintained notwithstanding several requests to reverse It. In a few cases men reached us who had escaped from the custody of an Ally, we returned these men, if requested, when opportunity offered. A French deserter to the German Army who had been captured by us was handed over to the French authorities, and a German officer who had been taken off a neutral ship on his way from the United States, where he had been attached to the German Embassy, and against whom serious charges were made, was handed over to the authorities of the United States when their Government declared war. But these were isolated and special cases . — our main policy never changed.
In response to the urgent requests of the French Government, 2,000 German prisoners were sent from this country to Le Havre and Rouen in the early part of 1916 They were completely under our control, but worked in French interests. The German Government professed to consider this procedure as intolerable. They also alleged that the conditions of their internment at these places were very bad. Except that the accommodation was somewhat crowded, there were no legitimate grounds for complaint, all other conditions being precisely the same as those which obtained in English camps. As a reprisal. the German Government sent 2,000 of our men to the neighbourhood of Mitaw and Libau, on their Eastern front, where they were kept under conditions which were deliberately rendered almost unbearable. and were exposed to a regime of calculated brutality. They announced their intention of keeping them in these places until their men were returned to England from Le Havre and Rouen. This, however, could not be conceded at the time, but it was eventually carried out in July, 1917, on the understanding that our men should be sent back to ordinary camps in Germany.
In certain cases. prisoners of war, both combatant and civilian, were transferred to Allied Governments at their own request after release by us. We handed them over as. free men and not as prisoners of war.
Alsatians and Lorrainers . — The movement of transfer by request started with French inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine, the first transfer of such men being made from this country in the summer of 1916. Each man, before transfer, was subjected to examination by the French authorities in this country. This procedure continued until the final repatriation. Fear of reprisals on their relatives made prisoners very anxious that their transfer to the French authorities should not become known in Germany.
They were assured that every effort would be made to avoid this, but that no undertaking could be given that this would be effective. Each man was required to sign a request for transfer in the following form :-
I desire to be handed over to the French Government.
I understand that the British authorities cannot guarantee that the fact of my transfer to France will be kept from the knowledge of the German Government.
In order to avoid the complications of transfer after capture, instructions were sent to the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief in France that all prisoners of Alsatian. and Lorraine nationality were to be transferred to the French authorities at once.
They were not to be recorded as captured by us; their names never appeared on our records, and were not reported by us to Germany. They were regarded as French prisoners from the first.
Poles.. — In June, 1917, the French Government took steps to form a purely Polish force, under French command, for service on their front, and the War Office was asked to transfer prisoners of true Polish national sentiment to France for service with this force. This was then thought to be unadvisable, but was reconsidered in 1918, when Poles were transferred to France under the same conditions as natives of Alsace and Lorraine.
Czechs.. — The question of men of Czecho-Slovak nationality being transferred by us came up in the summer of 1918, and on 6th November the first party of these men 37 in number, were released and handed over to a Czech officer. This transfer was carried out after the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak nation as an Ally.
After the conclusion of the armistices and before general repatriation came into force, prisoners belonging to certain nationalities, or being inhabitants of certain districts, were, at the request of the Foreign Office and with their own consent, released and handed over to representatives of the Governments which claimed them. Each individual was so claimed by name. Thus Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were handed over to Yugo-Slav representatives. and men from the districts of Malmedy, Moresnet Neutre and Kupen were transferred to the Belgian authorities. Those claimed by the Italian Polish and Roumanian Governments as being resident in districts to be assigned to them were taken in charge by representatives of these Governments. The receiving Government was in all cases required to make all arrangements for their repatriation.
5 (b.) To Neutrals.. — An application was received from a number of Danish Slesvig combatant and civilian prisoners of war in January, 1919, for repatriation to Denmark. These men resided in the country which would, it was anticipated, be ceded to Denmark : by the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The Foreign Office approved of their application on the condition that each man should be certified as acceptable by a representative of the Danish Legation. A number of combatant and civilian prisoners of war were accordingly repatriated under arrangements made by the Danish authorities.
(c.) Civilian prisoners of war. — A number of cases came to notice in various parts of the Empire of civilians having been interned as enemies who were, in fact, subjects of Allied or neutral States. Such men were released and handed over to representatives of their Governments after strict enquiry unless there were strong reasons for their retention. No man taken in arms was so released.
No question has received fuller consideration than that of reprisals. It has formed the subject of discussion in the Cabinet, in both Houses of Parliament, in Special Committees and in the Press. Both the moral and material aspects of the question have been fully considered. A large amount of the discussion on the subject has been devoted to the advisability of retaliatory action being taken on prisoners of war in our hands for the indignities and ill-treatment inflicted on British officers and men in Germany and Turkey, and, sometimes, for other infractions of the Laws of War. The wisdom of adopting a policy of reprisals found strong supporters and strong opponents, men who had themselves been prisoners of war being ranged on either side.
On each occasion that the question of reprisals arose on account of ill-treatment of British prisoners of war, the decision was based on the practical consideration whether or not better treatment could be anticipated for our officers and men if reprisals on those in our hands were taken, and the answer was generally in the negative. In fact, the conclusion ordinarily reached was that, far from bettering the condition of our men, their lot might and probably would be made even harder.
The following are some of the main considerations which presented themselves whenever the question of taking reprisals was under discussion :-
We could not compete with the Germans or Turks in brutality, Whatever we did would be surpassed by them.
Owing to the very insufficient amount of food issued to prisoners of war in enemy hands, we feared to run the risk of all food supplies from this country being prohibited. — a not improbable form of retaliation.
Our national characteristics are opposed to the ill-treatment of a man who has no power to resist, and this especially in the case of one who is not personally responsible for the acts complained of. It was possible, therefore, that however stringent might be the orders issued—and they would have to be designedly brutal to come down to the German level—their complete fulftilment would be evaded
We must be prepared to adhere to any line of action without regard to consequences . Our failure to do this in one notable case, where influential pressure, forced the abandonment of reprisals which had been taken on the crews of German submarines, was not one to be repeated.
In certain cases, when the circumstances promised good results, reprisals were taken. In others, the mere threat of reprisals—made only when we saw our way to enforce them—produced the desired results; eg., we threatened to force all Germen non-commissioned officers to work if the German authorities did not cease their persecution of British non-commissioned officers who refused to volunteer for labour ; and, again, we threatened retaliatory measures if the German Government did not cash remittances to British officers and others at a proper rate of exchange. The result in the first case was a marked amelioration of the treatment of British non-commmissioned officers; and in the second, the German Government accepted our terms and undertook to refund the sums improperly witheld.
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(a.) Visits of inspection.—There was naturally much curiosity to see the conditions under which prisoner: lived when camps were first opened in this country ; but as anyone entering a camp had to be accompanied by a member of the camp staff, of which the numbers were small, compliance with all requests would have thrown an intolerable burden on them It was necessary, from the first, to stop visits by newspaper reporters without sanction from the War Office, and to only few of them was this griven. General Officers Commanding-in-Chief were at first authorized to give permission for visits, but this led to abuses, and after September 1915, no person was owed to inspect a camp without a pass from the War Office. No one was allowed to take a photograph without permission, which was granted only to duly accredited officials.
(b.) Visits to individuals. —It was only in exceptional cases that a combatant prisoner of war had friends in this country, in consequence, the rules regarding visits to individual prisoners were mainly applicable to civilians alone.
Every prisoner of war might, with the consent of the Commandant, be visited once a month by two friends at the same time for a quarter of an hour. This time could be extended by a commandant in special circumstances. The visit took place in the presence of a member of the camp staff—the interpreter if the conversation was not conducted in English. Strict precautions were taken to prevent articles or information being illicitly pased into or out of a camp. Any article, parcel or book which was brought by a visitor was subject to censorship, men who had received visitors were sometimes searched and various other measures of security were adopted.
As a rule one day a week was set aside in each civilian camp for visits. The prisoner and their friends were then ranged on either side of a long table and not allowed to come into close contact. Under these conditions the time limit of a quarter of an hour could be exceeded without inconvenience.
From August, 1916, the Home Office dealt with all questions regarding visits to civilians, wherever interned in the United Kingdom.
(a.) Precautions.—Every prisoner of war and his luggage was carefully searched before quitting our custody. This was carried out by the police in the case of civilians. After the search, those due for transfer were isolated and their luggage was placed under guard. It could be re-opened only under supervision.
Owing to scarcity in enemy countries, prisoners made every effort to possess themselves of goods which were likely to be of use to themselves and their relatives in the event of repatriation, and they naturally used every device to pass these out of the country. Cushions stuffed with unravelled socks, money in the soles of boots, false bottoms to boxes, were comparatively common discoveries. Both on account of the shortage in this country and with a view to the strict maintenance of the blockade, a number of orders were issued, with the concurrence of the Departments concerned, as to what purchases were permissible and what might be taken abroad by a prisoner. Thus in November, 1917, a prisoner might take with him no more than one ounce of tobacco, one cake of soap and one box of matches. In the following January stringent orders were repeated against the purchase of any article of clothing not required for the man's immediate personal use. The purchase of leather and rubber goods was prohibited, and in September, 1918, a man might take none such with him even if obtained legitimately in this country. In all cases exception was made in the case of articles required by the prisoner for immediate medical treatment, or of which he was in possession when captured, or which he had received as presents from enemy countries.
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Following the nomenclature which has been employed throughout the war, the term "Release" is applied only to those cases where enemy subjects have been freed from internment, without giving parole, for any purpose except return to a hostile country. It includes the case of a prisoner allowed to enter a hostile country on parole. "Exchange" is used with regard to the transfer of prisoners of war between belligerents as the result of bargaining, each being concerned in obtaining the best terms for himself. "Repatriation" refers to similar transfers of prisoners, e.g.., incapacitated, civil clergy, medical practitioners, &c., where the grounds for the transfer are generally humanitarian, and there is no question of equality of numbers.
It will be observed that the transfer of prisoners of war to neutral countries on account of sickness or length of captivity falls within none of these definitions. They were transferred as prisoners and were held as such by the neutral Power on behalf of the captor.
(a.) Release.—Those released from internment fell into one of the following categories —
(1.) Civilians who, having been interned, were allowed to reside, either permanently or temporarily, in the country of internment under such supervision as was considered necessary, or to go to a neutral country.
The somewhat hasty insweep of civilian enemies in the United Kingdom in November, 1914, necessitated a revision of decisions in certain cases. This, as explained in the first chapter, was carried out by the War Office until May, 1915. Some were called on to make a declaration of neutrality before release, and in some cases British subjects of good standing were required as guarantors of their behaviour. It is understood that both these precautions, which were of little value, were abandoned hy the Home Office when all questions regarding the mternment and release of enemy civilian subjects were taken over by them.
In a few cases, and then only in the early days of the war, men were released to go to a neutral country.
(2.) Prisoners who were transferred at their own request to an Ally or neutral.
(3.) Civilians who, after internment, were found to be aubjects of Allied or neutral Powers.
The procedure in regard to the last two categories is given in Section 17 of this chapter :
(b.) Exchange—The exchange of prisoners of war, as defined above is best considered under two headings, viz, (1) the exchange of individuals, and (2) the exchange of considerable numbers, when, as a rule, equality of numbers and, in the case of combatants, similarity of ranks were conditious of the bargain.
(1.) Exchange of individuals.—At the commencement of the war, the relatives of some combatant and civilian prisoners of war interned in Germany brought much pressure on the authorities to effect the exchange of those in whom they were interested, and the Foreign Office opened up negotiations in certain cases. The War Office always regarded these proposals very coldly, as it seemed that those with influence and having opportunities to put forward their wishes must be unduly favoured. It was eventually agreed between the Prisoners of War Department and the War Office that attempts to effect individual exchanges of prisoners should be discontinued, except in cases where the individual in question was of special value to the country and his exchange was urged by a Government Departinent. Enemy Governments, however, continued to urge individual cases—always, as far as can be traced, these of men of good social standing, until the conclusion of hostilities.
The amount of correspondence which resulted from such proposals as were put forward in this country and those which emanated from enemy Governments was very large and produced insignificant results. Whatever suggestion for an exchange was made, it was regarded as preposterous by the hostile Government to which it was addressed. Diplomatic notes passed to and fro, and fresh bargains were attempted until all arguments were exhausted.
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Negotiations were opened in the first month of the war with a statement by the German Goverument that all British civilians would be allowed to leave Germany if the same were permitted to Germans in the United Kingdom. The disparity in numbers was great. we holding many more than they, and the proposal: was accordingly rejected. We offered, however, to repatriate, on condition of reciprocity, men of military age who were not under an obligation to serve, and who would give an underaking not to take any part in the war. This the German Government refused and they protested against our detention of men liable to military service, but not embodied, as being contrary to the Declaration of London.
By the end of October, 1914, an agreement had been reached for the mutual repatriation of all clergy, medical practitioners, women, children, and males under 17 and over 55. This was subsequently extended to our oversea possessions and Egypt, though the War Office pointed out the great difficulty of carrying it into effect. Men became eligible for repatriation on reaching the age of 55. Notwithstanding strong remonstrances from the German Government at the age limit being fixed at 55 instead. of 45, which was the maximum age for compulsory service, we adhered to the higher limit for a considerable time, as it was known that the Germans were enrolling so-called volunteers up to that age. A proposal to repatriate invalid civilians, irrespective of age, was refused by the German Government while we insisted on the 55 years limit. The negotiations on this subject therefore broke down temporarily.
In August, 1915, the German Government claimed that non-ordained missionaries should be repatriated as clergy. This was refused. Although strenuously opposed by Germany, our contention that only those civil doctors and clergy were entitled to repatriation whe were in our jurisdiction when the agreement came into force was applied. A concession was made in April, 1916, as regards ordained clergy. These, though captured subsequently to the date of the agreement, might be repatriated as an act of grace, each case being judged on its merits.
In the spring of 1915 the Pope interested himself in the matter of interned civilians. and seems to have brought considerable pressure to bear in Berlin, with the result that im August of that year the German Government consented to the repatriation of invalid civilians of any age on the condition that the agreement should be extended to British oversea possessions and protectorates. This was accepted after some demur. They refused, however, a proposal for a man-for-man exchange of civilians which had been put furward by the British Government. The schedule of disabilities justifying the repatriation of civilians was the same as that which had been agreed with the German Government as applicable to combatants (see Appendix 31). It is a severe schedule, but its application to civilians was justifed as nearly all Germans were reservists. It was made applicable throughout the Empire. Instructions were issued that the special limitations imposed on the repatriation of officers were to be applied to all whose social status was that of an officer and that the possession of papers exempting a man from military service was to be disregarded.
In the meantime, the question of the extension of all agreements to the crews of merchant ships came prominently to the fore. The German Government had insisted on regarding merchant seamen as a separate class and we had been forced to take the same course. Towards the close of 1915 an agreement was reached for the repatriation of ships' boys under 17, and early in the following year the German Government agreed to our proposal that seamen over 55, or when reaching that age, should be repatriated, on the condition that the agreement should not be limited to the United Kingdom. This was accepted.
No reply having been received to a proposal from the British Government that invalid merchant seamen should be repatriated as other civilians, a Note was despatched in February, 1916, calling for a reply and suggesting that officers of the Mercantile Marine, who had hitherto been excluded from all agreements, should be eligible for repatriation as invalids under the same terms as naval and military officer. No satisfactory arrangement was ever reached as regards these officers and men, and the the matter became further complicated when the Germans insisted on treating all crews of defensively armed merchant ships as combatants.
So far as civilians other than those belonging to the Mercantile Marine were concerned, the year 1916 saw a large number of proposals from both sides and a general relaxation of the 55 years age limit which had hitherto been maintained by the War Office. The German Government made several proposals, all of which were refused by us, for the mutual repatriation of all civilians, and signified their willingness to give an undertaking, on promise of similar action by us, that none so repatriated should be engaged in any military capacity. Negotiations were much delayed by accusations of bad faith, and by the German method of dealing only with some points in a British Note while ignoring others.
As a result of many Notes exchanged during 1916, an agreement was reached in January, 1917, for the repatriation of all interned civilians over 45 (or who might attain that age while interned) except 20 who might be retained by either party for"military reasons". Retired officers and the crews (exclusive of officers) of merchant ships were included among civilians for this purpose. The operation of this agreement was extended to our Oversea possessions, and it was limited to those who were in our hands on the date when it was concluded. The necessity for this limitation was strongly insisted on by the Admiralty, as a concession on this point, which was strenuously demanded by the German Government, would have meant the assurance of a free passage to any German over 45 who might desire to leave the United States or other neutral country.
In November, 1916, owing to the failure of the German Government to carry out their undertakings for the repatriation of invalids, a fresh proposal was put forward by the British Government for the inspection of all who might desire to present themselves to a medical board, composed of Swiss doctors, and those of the captor State. This followed the ordinary course, going backwards and forwards between this country and Germany, with suggested amendments, strong objections to various points and various proposals, with the result that nothing was settled.
The unwillingness of the German authorities to repatriate civilians under the agreements was due in part, to our inability to repatriate on from overseas. The difficulty in effecting this was not only that of scarcity of shipping, but also the military objections to the passage of enemy subjects through the Suez Canal and naval objections, connected with the convoy system, to bringing them to Europe by the west coast of Africa.
Until the spring of 1916 the repatriation of prisoners of war, combatants as well as civilians, had been effected fairly satisfactorily by means of Dutch ships plying between Flushing and this country. The Netherlands Government then declared their inability to continue this service, and a British hospital ship was used for the transport of combatants, civilians being transferred by any ship available. This continued until February, 1917, when the unrestricted activity of German submarines was commenced. The German Government proclaimed a war zone in waters surrounding the United Kingdom and announced their intention to sink every ship within that area. The service of hospital ships across the North Sea was accordingly discontinued. A Note of 5th February from the German Government declared that the direct route between this country and Holland must be considered unsafe, and that repatriation could be continued only by means of Dutch paddle steamers, whose safety they were prepared to guarantee, or by hospital ships outside the danger zone to the south of France and thence through Switzerland. They were prepared to repatriate British prisoners by whichever of these routes we adopted; but they urged the Dutch boats as providing a quicker and more humane route for invalids :
These proposals were submitted to the Admiralty and the War Office, and both were strongly of opinion that they should be refused. We were not prepared to accept German dictation, and the probably wished to elicit official recognition of the war zone. In the view of the Admiralty, while there was no objection to civilians being conveyed in Dutch boats, combatants should be transported only in a British hospital ship and under the British flag.
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The German Government also demanded that Germans overseas should be warned of the dangers they must run during repatriation by sea, and that none who did not accept the risks should be brought through the barred area. No action was taken on this.
In the above circumstances, repatriation had ceased when the conference between British and German delegates took place at The Hague in the summer of 1917.
The question of repatriation was fully discussed during this conference, its discontinuance having brought it into much prominence. It was agreed the as repatriation between the United Kingdom and Holland should be resumed as possible, and. as the two Governments could not agree as to the procedure, the Netherlands Government should be requested to undertake the transport. They assented to this and put into the service one ordinary and two paddle-wheel Dutch steamships which ran on an assigned course between Rotterdam and Boston. As before stated, these boats were painted as hospital ships, a procedure which was opposed to the the views of the Admiralty who were concerned that such distinguishing mark should be reserved for ships employed on genuine hospital services only. A mutual undertaking was also given to take up the question of extension of existing agreemen as regards civilians (see paragraph 1 and Annex 2 of Appendix 1).
The transport of civilians to and from Holland was effected without any serious hindrance as a result of this agreement.
In March. 1918, the German Government proposed that all British civilians in Germany and all German civilians in the United Kingdom and overseas, including the occupied German colonies, whether interned or not, should be mutually repatriated if they so desired, but that each party should be allowed to keep back a limited number: Men so repatriated should not be employed in any military capacity, or required — presumably, they might volunteer—to perform any non-combatant service. As an alternative, they proposed a man-for-man exchange under the same conditions as above, the balance of Germans being transferred, if they so desired, to a neutral country, where they were to be at liberty, and any who desired to remain in the country where they were interned were to be released. Lack of sea transport, the considerable addition to the man-power of Germany even under the restrictions as to employment which were proposed, the difficulty of finding any neutral country which would take the balance of the Germans and the harm they could do as German agents if free in that country, apart from the impossibility of release in this country or elsewhere of those whe desired to remain, made acceptance impossible. The second conference at The Hague in the summer of 1918 arranged for the return to their own country of all civilians. This was rather a question of exchange and is dealt with under that heading.
After considerable correspondence, commencing in August, 1914, between the Foreign Office and the War Oflice, an agreement was concluded with the Austro-Hungarian Government in the following February, but with effect from 4th October, 1914, for the mutual repatriation of :-
Civil clergy.
Women and children.
Civil medical practitioners.
Boys under 18.
Men who had received no military training and were over 43. (The Austrian age limit for military service was 42, but they took a man up to the end of the year in which he completed his 42nd year. )
Men, including retired ofticers, over 50.
An undertaking to take no part in hostilities was to be exacted from retired officers and from any other class from whom it was demanded by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. Any man suspected of espionage or who was under any contract of military or naval service, unless physically incapable of such service, might be held.
It came to our knowledge in May, 1915, that the laws regarding liability to Landsturm service had been modified. The Austro-Hungarian Government was therefore informed that we would repatriate no men in the 5th Class of the existing agreement, nor any, except invalids, over 17 years of age or under 51. This was subsequently extended to 60.
In the spring of 1916 the Foreign Office, having obtained the somewhat grudging consent of the War Office, put forward a proposal to the Austro-Hungarian Government for the mutual repatriation of male civilians over 51 and of those over 45 who were unfit for active service, except, in both cases, such as might be retained for "military reasons."This led to much correspondence, in the course of which it was agreed (1) that the proposed agreement should be applicable to Austro-Hungariansin all parts of the British Empire; (2) that the previous agreement of 4th Oct 1914 (as subsequently modified), was applicable only to those who were in the hands of either party on that date; (3) that the new proposals would include all who were held by either on the date of their acceptance ; and (4) that the old and proposed agreements should be applicable to the nationals of either State, whether interned or not Being called on to define the meaning of the term "military reasons" which would justify retention, the British Government said that it was intended to cover all when there were reasonable grounds to suspect of a war crime or any who might be of value to the enemy. The proposals were eventually accepted by the Austro-Hungarian Government and became operative from 24th July, 1917—over a year after they were first mooted. By a subsequent agreement each Government became responsible for the expense of repatriating its own civilian nationals.
Delay in concluding any agreement between enemies is inevitable. It is due to the indirect channel of communications which must be employed between hostile States, to natural distrust of any proposal put forward, and to the changing circumstances of war which frequently necessitate a change of policy in the midst of negotiations.
The conclusion of this agreement was followed by a protracted correspondence as to the inclusion of merchant seaman among civilians. The Austro-Hungarian Government, having adopted the same attitude as the Germans, declined to regard a seaman taken from a defensively armed merchant ship as anything but a combatant. Negotiations on this subject were still in progress when the Armistice was signed.
In February, 1917, the Austro-Hungarian Government proposed the repatriation ofcivilian prisoners regardless of age. As the numbers were all in favour of themselves, we holding about 5,000 of their nationals and they only a few hundreds of ours, this was declined.
Certain proposals were made in 1918. The first, for the transfer of invalids to Holland, was accepted by the Netherlands Government with strict limitations as to numbers, but was eventually rejected by our own. In its place was substituted a proposal to adopt a very lenient schedule of disabilities as justifying repatriation. Thiis was agreed to by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The third was a renewed effort by same Government to effect a general repatriation. This was accepted by us on the understanding that all British who so desired should be repatriated as against a similar number of Austro-Hungarians, and that the balance of the latter, less those retained for military reasons should be sent back if and when their Government were able to prevail on the Turkish Government to carry out its undertaking to repatriate civilians and certain categories of prisoners of war.
But it mattered little what was arranged. Everything depended on sea transport.That from British possessions was practically impossible since Germany had started unrestricted submarine warfare, and it was only in September, 1918 that we learnt that the German Government had consented to allow any vacant places on the ships specially plying between Boston and Rotterdam, and for which they paid, to be occupied by Austro-Hungarians from the United Kingdom. Lack of railway transport and French objections prevented our repatriating them by way of France and Switzerland.
[71]
In February, 1915, a telegram was received from the United States Ambassador in Constantinople to the effect that the Turkish Government were prepared allow all British and French civilians to leave the country if Ayoub Sabri Bey and Zinnoun Bey, men of weight in the Young Turk party, were released from Malta. The British Government replied that this should be done as soon as the United States Ambassador in Constantinople had assured himself that the Turkish undertaking would be actualy be carried out. It is not known whether any further correspondence took place on this subject,
In November of the same year the Foreign Office suggested to the War Office the advisability of effecting an agreement for the mutual repatriation of all British, French and Turkish civilians who desired to return to their own countries. They also proposed, with the concurrence of the French Government, that neither party should be permitted to retain any man for military reasons. The War Office accepted this proposal, which was made to the Turkish Government in January, 1916, but as far as is known no reply was received from them. It is doubtful if the War Office records are complete as regards negotiations with Turkey for the repatriation of civilians during the first 2 years of the war.
In December, 1916, the French Government, at the suggestion of the Foreign Office, made a proposal to the Turkish Government, in the name of the British and French Governments, to the same effect as that made by the British Government in the preceding January. The War Office, however, stated that any agreement reached would not be considered binding as regards Turkish civilians in the occupied portions of Mesopotamia, as they were in a position to give valuable information to the enemy.
By their reply the Turkish Government refused to repatriate men of military age or any possessing special information. They nevertheless insisted ou the release of Ayoub Sabri and Zinnoun, one, if not both, of whom was of military age.
In consultation with the French Government it was decided to adhere to the demand for « general repatriation of civilians, but to accept the Turkish view as to detention of individuals to the extent of allowing each party to keep 20, of whom 10 might be detained by the French and 10 by ourselves. A note to this effect was despatched in February, 1917.
In the meantime the Turkish Government made several threats of reprisal on civilians in their hands if Ayoub Sabri and Zinnoun were not released, but the only reply vouchsafed was to the effect that these men would regain their liberty only on the general repatriation of civilians. Although subjected to close supervision, few, if any, British or French civilians had, up to then, been actually interned, and, thanks to the good offices of the American Embassy, some of the Turkish threats were not carried out. But in order to bring pressure on us regarding Ayoub Sabri and Zinnoun some civilians were transferred to inaccessible places in Asia Minor and others were interned.
In June, 1917, the Netherlands Minister in Constantinople, who had represented British interests since the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Turkey, suggested that he should be authorized to bargain for the release of Ayoub Sabri and Zinnoun, on the condition that he obtained permission to visit the camps of prisoners of war in Turkey and that all British civilians who had been sent out of Constantinople should be aallowed to return there. This proposal was rejected by the British Government.
In August of this[?1917] year the Turkish Government, replying to the British Note of February, definitely refused to contemplate a general repatriation of civilians. This was followed by a further Note from the British Government, offering to release Ayoub Sabri and Ziunoun on the condition that the Turkish Government agreed to the inspection of camps by representatives of the protecting Legation at Constantinople, the general repatriation of all civilians, less 20 who might be detained by both parties, and an exchange of combatants on a reasonable scale.
Separate negotiations had been carried on with regard to the repatriation of merchant seamen who, unlike the majority of civilians, had been interned by the Turkish authorities, but nothing had resulted from them.
Such was the state of negotiations when the conference of British and Turkish delegates assembled at Berne in November, 1917. It was then agreed (see Article 8 of Appendix 3) —
To allow civilians who were not of military age, and who so desired, to leave the country where they were interned, detained or at liberty; those undergoing punishment or awaiting trial being excepted.
That male civilians between 17 and 50 years of age should be exchanged in equal numbers.
That members of the Mercantile Marine, certain administrative officials, police and retired officers should be considered as civilians for this purpose.
Ayoub Sabri Bey, Zinnoun Bey and Reschid Bey (seemingly a personal friend of the senior Turkish delegate) were specially mentioned as beneficiaries under the agreement.
Articles 9 and 10 of Appendix 3 give detailed arrangements as regards the methods and routes for repatriation, the incidence of expenses incurred composition of the earlier transports.
This agreement was ratified by the British Government early in January 1918 but. not withstandiing several demands made by them, it was not until the latter part of April that a similar step was taken by the Turkish Government.
In the closing months of 1915 both the British and Bulgarian Governments declared their readiness to allow all civilians to return to their homes on the promise of reciprocity. The British Government stipulated, however, that any to whom definite suspicion attached might be held. The Bulgarian Government took no steps to give effect to their proposal, and we delayed action until assured that the undertaking would be strictly observed by them, with the result that nothing was done.
In July, 1916, the Foreign Office, after some correspondence with the War Office, moved again in the matter, offering to allow all Bulgarian civilians who were the United Kingdom at the outbreak of war to leave the country on the condition of reciprocity. To this the Bulgarian Government replied that they refused to allow British subjects to leave as long as any Bulgars were detained in this country. This was followed by a second Note from the Bulgarian Government, demanding that permission to return to their country should be extended to all Bulgars in our oversea possessions. This was refused in November, 1916. Nothing more was heard of the matter until the following autumn, when the Bulgarian Government again expressed its readiness to allow British civilians to leave if a similar concession was accorded to their subjects throughout the Empire. The execution of such an agreement being impracticable for us, the Bulgarian proposal was declined. No repatriation of civilians was ever
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