Many thanks Frances,

I think I am getting a little nearer to an answer, but I think the following passage from theIllegitimacy section may have a relevance

VIZ

The bearing of a child in widowhood can also deprive the widow of any widow-right as witness the following case Manx Liberal 1841.

Before the Queen in Council
Elizabeth Cain- Appellant, and Wm Cain, and Christian, his wife- Respondents

It maybe remembered that sometime ago the respondent, Wm Cain, in respect of his wife, who was heiress at law to John Cain, deceased, brought an action against the present appellant, Elizabeth Cain, widow, to recover certain Lands situate in the parish of Michael, called Barnagh, claiming her to have forfeited her widow-right in the said estate by incontinence, or the giving birth to an illegitimate Child, during her widowhood.

After the declaration at law had been filed, the cause came on to heard at Ramsey on the 16th of February 1836, when the action was dismissed which verdict Wm Cain traversed [appealed] to the House of Keys. and on the 18th of March 1836, on which the traversal or appeal was heard, the House reversed the verdict appealed from and awarded the respondents entitled to the said lands of Barnagh ; from which judgement Elizabeth Cain appealed to her Majesty in Council, before whom it has been pending for a considerable time, until the present month, when her Majesty, with the advice of her Privy Council, was pleased to dismiss the appeal with costs.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

The interesting feature of this passage is that the Court in Ramsey dismissed a deprivation of widow-right claim in 1836 of the grounds of a illegitimacy. Unless the Court wilfully returned a perverse judgment in defiance of the law, which is extremely unlikely, this suggests that prior to the Cain v Cain case of 1836, that judicial opinion in the Island was not 100% certain on the matter, otherwise the defendant would have had no defence to offer, and the court could not have returned the verdict it did.

This judgment was reversed on appeal, so suggests that the presiding judge was wrong to believe that, BUT in the circumstances existing prior to 1836, that is irrelevant. If the Court rejected a "deprivation of widow-right" action in 1836, it suggests that a subsequent illegitimacy was Not necessarily seen as a cause to strike down widow-right prior to that hearing.

It would also suggest that deprivation of widow right hearings were infrequent prior to 1836. The reason I say this is that had there been a significant number of cases, the point would be well known in law, and the court would have clear precedents to go on, so such a verdict would be impossible.

From this I would conclude that

A) deprivation of widow-right hearings were rare
B) that as the Court of First Instance found in favour of the widow, that until 1836 legal opinion was not unanimous that a subsequent illegitimacy would remove the right.

After 1836, or 1841, when the Privy Council delivered its judgment, the law WAS clear, but prior to 836 there seems to have been a belief that window rights were not forfeited, and the events we are looking at were between 1818 and 1827 !!

Does anyone have any further thoughts on the situation prior to the 1836 court case ?

Researching one's ancestors certainly throws up some fascinating issues. When I read law at university it never struck me that many years later I would be studying an inheritance case in Manx law that was decided in 1836 !

As a final point, in England a Junior court is bound by the precedents set by a senior court, so if the English Court of Appeal has decided that the law is X, the judge of first instance is obliged to apply that precedent in a subsequent case. The Court of Appeal would also be bound, and it is only a Superior Court, i.e. the House of Lords that can depart from it. Can anyone confirm if the Manx courts applied the same general principle. If so, then it would suggest that there were few if any cases prior to 1836, in which a widow-right had been struck down, and none known to the trial judge, otherwise he would have been bound to apply them.

If on the other hand, precedent was not binding, then we enter a grey area in which the law is even more obscure.

Robert